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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 688: A REAPPRAISAL IN
LIGHT OF A CHANGING WORLD ORDER
Judy A. Gallant*
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the Gulf War Iraqi forces, utilizing tanks and
helicopter gunships, extinguished Kurdish insurrections in northern
Iraq and Shia Muslim uprisings in southern Iraq.' Approximately two
million Kurds fled the atrocities2 caused by the Iraqi suppression.3 The
United Nations Security Council, reacting with unparalleled speed and
effectiveness, adopted Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991, 4 which created
the legal authority for other nations to intervene in Iraq for humanitar-
ian purposes.5 As a result of Resolution 688 the United States, Great
Britain, and France dispatched armed forces to create refugee areas for
displaced Kurds in northern Iraq within which humanitarian aid agen-
* J.D. Candidate, 1993, Washington College of Law, The American University.
With special thanks to Professor Domingo Acevedo.
1. Decades of Disaster: The United Nations' Response: Hearing Before the House
Select Committee on Hunger, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1991) [hereinafter Int'l Law
Perspective] (testimony of Ved P. Nanda, Director, International Legal Studies Pro-
gram, U. of Denver College of Law, entitled A United Nations Convention on the
Right to Food, Humanitarian Intervention, and the U.N. Response to International
Disasters - An International Law Perspective).
2. See William Safire, Duty to Intervene, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1991, at A17 (stat-
ing that the Kurds risked starvation and exposure to the cold while fleeing from certain
slaughter); The Law Learns from the Kurds, N.Y. TIbsEs, Apr. 14, 1991, at D18 (char-
acterizing Hussein's repression of his own people as bordering on genocide).
3. Int'l Law Perspective, supra note 1, at 67. See also David J. Scheffer, Use of
Force After the Cold War: Panama, Iraq. and the New World Order, in RiGHT v.
MIGHr: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 109, 144 (2d ed. 1991) [herein-
after RIGHT v. MIGHT] (noting that the Iraqi government drove two million Kurds and
Shiites into Turkey, Iran, and Southern Iraq).
4. U.N. Doc. S/RES/688, Apr. 5, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991)
(adopted ten to three, with Cuba, Yemen, and Zimbabwe against, and China and India
abstaining). See infra note 8 (providing the full text of the Resolution).
5. RIGHT V. MIGHT, supra note 3, at 145.
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cies could safely operate.6 Not surprisingly, Iraq vehemently opposed
these actions as an unwarranted violation of state sovereignty.1
The Resolution demanded that Iraq immediately end the repression
of the Kurds and Shia Muslims and insisted that Iraq permit access by
international humanitarian organizations in order to assist those in
need.8 In addition, the Resolution commanded that Iraq honor its hu-
6. See Int'l Law Perspective, supra note 1, at 68, 96 (explaining that after the
United States initially warned Iraq regarding military movements in the Kurdish areas
north of the 36th parallel, the United States and coalition forces entered and created
"safe-havens" for the Kurds); Elaine Sciolino, After the War; U.S. Troops to Build
Camps in North Iraq to Aid Kurds; Bush Sees 'Temporary' Role, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 1991, at Al (quoting President Bush as stating that temporary humanitarian sup-
port stations would provide food, clothing and medicine to the Kurds).
7. Int'l Law Perspective, supra note 1, at 68; Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern
Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti - Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Inter-
vention Under International Law - Part I, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305, 306
(1992) [hereinafter Tragedies].
8. U.N. Doc. S/RES/688, Apr. 5, 1991, at 1-2, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991)
[hereinafter S/RES/688]. The Resolution went on to mandate that Iraq "make
available all necessary facilities for those operations .... " Id. at 2. The pertinent
portions of the text of the Resolution follow:
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2982nd Meeting on 5 April 1991
The Security Council
Mindful of its duties and its responsibilities under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Recalling Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations,
Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many
parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas which led to a
massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross
border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region,
Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved....
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territo-
rial integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all States in the area, ...
1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of
Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of
which threaten international peace and security in the region;
2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to international
peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and expresses
the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that
the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected;
3. Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian orga-
nizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make availa-
ble all necessary facilities for their operations;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq
and to report forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further mission to the
region, on the plight of the Iraqi civilian population, and in particular the Kurd-
ish population, suffering from the repression in all its forms inflicted by the Iraqi
authorities;
5. Requests further the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his dispo-
sal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies to address urgently
the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population;
6. Appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to con-
tribute to these humanitarian relief efforts;
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manitarian obligationsY The Security Council appealed to all member
states and humanitarian organizations to participate in the humanitar-
ian relief operations.' 0 More importantly, the Security Council con-
demned Iraq's repression of its civilian population and characterized
the consequences of the Kurdish repression as creating a threat to in-
ternational peace and security."
This unprecedented 2 Resolution has brought the issue of humanitar-
ian intervention13 to the forefront of international concern and legal
discourse. Never before have armed troops protected the actions of hu-
manitarian aid agencies.1 4 Just a few weeks after the adoption of Reso-
lution 688 former United Nations Secretary-General Javier P6rez de
Cu6llar remarked on the perpetual conflict between sovereignty and
human rights.'" In questioning the traditionally sacrosanct concept of
sovereignty, he underscored the marked shift in world public opinion
towards the belief that support of basic human rights should prevail
over boundaries arbitrarily drawn upon a map."6 Thus, an assessment
of whether Resolution 688 establishes a mandate for future interven-
tion in situations involving egregious human rights violations requires a
fundamental re-evaluation of traditional notions regarding sovereignty,
7. Demands that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary-General to these ends;
8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Id.
9. U.N. Doe. S/PV.2982 at 58 (1991) (providing text of the Resolution debates)
[hereinafter Resolution Debates].
10. S/RES/688, supra note 8, at 2.
11. S/RES/688, supra note 8, at 1. See infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text
(explaining that Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter grants the Security Coun-
cil enforcement powers to take action in response to threats to international peace and
security).
12. See David J. Scheffer, How the United Nations Balances Concerns for Sover-
eignty and Suffering, Address at the Annual Meeting of the Conference on Washing-
ton Representatives on the United Nations 6 (Aug. 6, 1991) (hereinafter U.N.A.]
(transcript available at The American University Journal of International Law and
Policy) (concluding that Resolution 688 created a significant precedent because until
this time aid agencies were required to obtain the consent of the host government
before they could operate within a country's borders, whereas the Resolution deprived
Iraq of the customary right to deny the efforts of humanitarian aid organizations).
See also id. at 6-7 (noting that in practical terms, negotiation with Iraq was necessary
in order to settle the logistics of the aid operations).
13. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (defining and explaining humani-
tarian intervention).
14. See U.N.A., supra note 12, at 9 (suggesting that relief agencies may now enjoy
the right to protection).
15. U.N.A., supra note 12, at 4-5. Moreover, the leaders of the largest industrial
nations at the July 1991 G-7 summit in London pledged themselves to strengthening
the United Nations system in general and specifically, its ability to uphold human
rights. Id. at 5.
16. U.N.A., supra note 12, at 5.
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nonintervention and domestic jurisdiction, especially in view of the in-
creasing internationalization of human rights standards. This Comment
demonstrates that principles relating to state sovereignty and domestic
jurisdiction have lost their privileged status, particularly when they
conflict with the protection of fundamental human rights. The Security
Council's swift and successful mobilization in reaction to the mistreat-
ment of the Kurds reflects this trend. Part I of this Comment discusses
traditional concepts regarding the customary international law doctrine
of humanitarian intervention, both unilateral and multilateral. Part II
addresses the argument for unilateral humanitarian intervention in the
context of United Nations Charter (Charter) prohibitions on the use of
force. Part III considers Security Council powers under Chapter VII of
the Charter and assesses Security Council membership and voting pro-
cedures vis-a-vis their effectiveness and adherence to the Charter's
goals. Part IV analyzes modern notions of sovereignty, domestic juris-
diction, and what constitutes a threat to the peace. In addition, Part IV
assesses the ability of the United Nations to intervene for humanitarian
reasons as evinced by the Security Council's response to the Kurdish
tragedy. Part V recommends a fundamental reassessment of the config-
uration of the Security Council including issues of membership and
voting rights in order to revitalize the United Nations collective secur-
ity system.
I. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DEFINED AND THE
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCTRINE
While varying degrees of intervention exist ranging from diplomatic
protests to economic sanctions, to the use of force, 7 this Comment fo-
cuses solely on intervention,' both multilateral and unilateral,"9 involv-
17. W. Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to
Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167,
179 n.42 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).
18. LASSA FRANCIS LAWRENCE OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW; A TREATISE
305 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (defining intervention as the "dictatorial
interference by a State in the affairs of another State for the purpose of maintaining or
altering the actual condition of things").
19. See Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of
Humanitarian Interventions: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 17 Comp.
INT'L L. Q. 27, 28 n.2 (1980) [hereinafter Customary Int'l Law Doctrine] (noting the
distinction between multilateral and unilateral humanitarian intervention). Multilateral
intervention refers to action taken by or authorized under an appropriate international
body, such as the United Nations or a regional organization such as the Organization
of American States. Id. Unilateral intervention refers to the use of force either by a




ing the use of force for humanitarian reasons. Humanitarian interven-
tion refers to the "use of armed force by one state against another to
protect the nationals of the latter from acts or omissions of their own
government which shock the conscience of mankind." 2 The doctrine
recognizes the right of states to use force in another state's internal
activities when the latter violates the laws of humanity."1 A substantial
number of contemporary international legal scholars regard humanitar-
ian intervention as an established canon of customary international
law.22 Before the establishment of the United Nations, legal scholars
and state practice alike substantiated the customary international law
doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention as a permissible justifi-
cation for intervention.23 Some contend that the doctrine is so clearly
accepted under customary international law that there is no question as
to its existence;2 only its boundaries are open to discussion. 2  Many
20. Farrokh Jhabvala, Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and International
Law, 21 IND. J. INT'L L. 208, 212 (1981). See also OPPENHaIM, supra note 18, at 312-
13 (maintaining that expert opinion and state practice support the view that states do
not enjoy unlimited license on how they treat their subjects and that humanitarian
intervention is legally valid when a state persecutes its nationals to such a degree as to
violate fundamental human rights); FERNANDO R. TtSON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVEN-
TION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 5 (1988) (adding an additional compo-
nent to the definition of humanitarian intervention by describing it as proportional state
assistance to citizens in another nation whose basic human rights are violated and who
are themselves willing to rise up against their government).
21. Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Hu-
manitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 Ab,. J. INT'L L. 275, 277 n.12 (1973)
(quoting Antoine Rougier, La Thborie de l'Intervention d'Humanit', 17 REVUE
GfNERALE DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 468 (1910)). See also lstvan Pogany, Humanitar-
ian Intervention in International Law: The French Intervention In Syria Re-examined,
35 INT'L & CobiP. L. Q. 182, 183 (1986) (quoting ELLERY CORY STOWELL, IN'ER-
VENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1921)) (finding that humanitarian intervention
permits force to protect against behavior that eAceeds the boundaries of the authority
of the sovereign).
22. See Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Response by Professors Mc-
Dougal and Reisman, 3 INT'L LAW. 438, 438 (1969) [hereinafter Response] (observing
that humanitarian intervention is a well-established principle of customary interna-
tional law); Int'l Law Perspective, supra note 1, at 77 (affirming that the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention gained broad approval as a constituent element of customary
international law); Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention" A Reply to Dr.
Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW & CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 229, 232 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974) [hereinafter Reply] (stat-
ing that jurists such as Grotius, Vattel, Wheaton, and others have embraced the doc-
trine). But cf. Franck & Rodley, supra note 21, at 299 (concluding that neither the
United Nations nor state practice support a general right of forceful humanitarian
intervention).
23. See TtSON, supra note 20, at 5 (maintaining that both international treaties
and state practice demonstrate humanitarian intervention's validity under international
law).
24. See Michael J. Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Interven-
tion in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547,
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writers justify the doctrine through analogy, comparing humanitarian
intervention to traditional custom where a country has an absolute
right to intervene in a foreign state when a national's property or life
are endangered.2 6 The analogy gained force as a result of the paradox
that while customary international law allowed intervention for the pro-
tection of one's own nationals, intervention to rescue large numbers of
people brutally massacred by their own government was not considered
to be legitimate.27 Despite these arguments, other observers assert that
international law does not sanction unilateral humanitarian
intervention.2
8
Although clearly preferring collective action,29 numerous writers
from the mid-19th century to the present have supported the lawfulness
of unilateral humanitarian intervention.3" According to this view, hu-
582-92 (1987) (recalling such classic cases of humanitarian intervention as the French
intervention in Syria in 1860, the multinational rescue operation in the Congo in 1964,
the Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, and the Tanzanian intervention in
Uganda in 1979). See generally id. (discussing cases); TtSON, supra note 20, at 155-88
(same); Franck & Rodley, supra note 21, at 277-95 (same).
25. Richard B. Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 MCGILL L.J.
205, 210 (1969) [hereinafter Intervention]; Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note
19, at 56-57 (quoting International Law Association, The International Protection of
Human Rights by General International Law, Interim Report of the Sub-Committee,
International Committee on Human Rights 11 (The Hague, 1970)).
26. See Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help By States To Protect Human
Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 327 (1967) [hereinafter Self-Help] (observing that in-
ternational law offered protection for the human rights of individuals when abroad).
27. U.N.A., supra note 12, at 3. See also HERScH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 121 (1950) (underscoring the paradox that aliens have
more protection under international law than a citizen residing in his own state). It is
important to note the distinction between humanitarian intervention and the rescue of
nationals, the latter of which rests on principles that are inapplicable to interventions
on behalf of human rights. See TfSON, supra note 20, at 5 (doubting whether rescue of
nationals is in fact humanitarian because it can be subsumed under the rubric of self-
defense principles or the rules regarding the diplomatic protection of nationals);
Jhabvala, supra note 20, at 210-12 (noting the distinction between protection of nation-
als and humanitarian intervention). The Israeli rescue at Entebbe, Uganda is often
cited as a typical example of the protection of nationals. U.N.A., supra note 12, at 3.
28. See HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 64 (Richard B.
Lillich ed., 1973) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION] (statement of Professor
Franck) (stating that international law does not support unilateral humanitarian inter-
vention; the boundaries are unclear at best); see also infra note 32 and accompanying
text (discussing the arguments of opponents of humanitarian intervention).
29. See Self-Help, supra note 26, at 346 (characterizing individual determinations
of when to use forceful measures as less reliable than a collective determination by an
international organization representing the interests of many nations).
30. Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 42. See id. at 43 (quoting
Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, Le Droit International Codifi 272, art. 478) (Lardy transl.
1874) (stating that intervention, principally applied to civil strife situations, is permissi-
ble to uphold basic human rights when they are violated); TtSON, supra note 20, at 129
(citing scholars who uphold the legal right of humanitarian intervention as including
Stowell, Rougier, Reisman, McDougal, Lillich, D'Amato, Moore, Sornarajah,
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manitarian concerns trump the commands of sovereignty and indepen-
dence.31 Other legal scholars, however, discarded the notion of humani-
tarian intervention, finding the doctrine illegal in its violation of the
sovereign independence of states.3 2 The advent of the United Nations,
moreover, reinforced the principle of sovereignty and emphasized mul-
tilateral, rather than unilateral, action. At this juncture, therefore, it is
useful to examine the development of the doctrine of humanitarian in-
tervention as it was challenged by the formation of the United Nations
Charter and the codification of the customary laws prohibiting the use
of force.
II. UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
ARTICLE 2(4)'S PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES
According to article 2(4)13 of the Charter, all members pledge to
abstain from the threat or use of force in two situations: first, when
force is used to impact upon the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of a state; and second, when it is used in any other aspect
contrary to the goals of the United Nations." The only exceptions en-
Fonteyne, and Bazyler); id. at 245 (concluding that humanitarian intervention is com-
patible with the United Nations Charter and is an acknowledged exception to the ban
on the use of force). But see Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAw &
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217, 218 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974) [herein-
after Brownlie] (contending that few modern commentators, if knowledgeable about
current state practice and legal analysis on the use of force, would embrace forcible
humanitarian intervention).
31. See Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 43 (quoting Lettre de M.
Arntz, in Rolin-Jacquemyns, Note sur la Thborie du Droit d'Intervention, 8 REVUE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LtGISLATION COMPAREN 675 (1876)) (recognizing the
absolute right of intervention against all states irrespective of sovereign rights); see also
Bazyler, supra note 24, at 572 (quoting British legal scholar M. Bernard, On the Prin-
ciple of Non-Intervention 33-34 (1860)) (declaring that while positive law forbade in-
tervention, situations involving gross human rights violations mandated that positive
law be ignored).
32. See Franck & Rodley, supra note 21, at 302 (citing Corfu Channel (U.K. v.
Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Merits) (Judgment of Apr. 9)) (noting that the International
Court of Justice declared that no legal right of forceful intervention exists regardless of
the shortcomings of international organizations); Brownlie, supra note 30, at 226 (pro-
posing that unilateral humanitarian intervention constitutes unlawful activity);
Jhabvala, supra note 20, at 230 (finding that international law does not sanction unilat-
eral humanitarian intervention); Jack Donnelly, Human Rights. Humanitarian Inter-
vention and American Foreign Policy, 37 J. INT'L AFFAIRS 311, 319 (1984) (stating
that international law does not permit unilateral humanitarian intervention); Franck &
Rodley, supra note 21, at 305 (concluding that a practical definition of humanitarian
intervention would be hard to establish and nearly impossible to apply strictly).
33. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
34. Id. The article states that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
19921
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
compassed within the Charter to the prohibition on the use of force are
self-defense 35 and collective security actions taken pursuant to Chapter
VII 6 of the Charter.
3 7
Two divergent views of article 2(4) and its impact upon the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention developed among international legal
scholars. One school of thought interprets article 2(4) as absolute while
the second views it as a conditional, qualified ban on the use of force.38
In regard to the latter interpretation, supporters 9 of humanitarian in-
tervention emphasize that article 2(4) does not prohibit the use of force
per se, but only for certain unlawful purposes. 40 Because the doctrine
contemplates neither territorial change nor a challenge to the political
independence of the state involved, and conforms with fundamental
norms of the Charter, article 2(4) does not preclude humanitarian in-
tervention.41 The closing words of article 2(4), prohibiting the use of
force in any aspect contrary to the purposes of the United Nations
Charter, when read in conjunction with the human rights provisions
throughout the Charter,42 lend further credence to this proposi-
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." Id. See also Mary E. O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the
Use of Force: The U.N.'s Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J.
453, 454 n.4 (1991) (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nica-
ragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97-103 (Merits) (Judgment of June 27) (stating
that customary international law incorporates article 2(4)'s prohibitions)); Anthony C.
Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms, 27 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 1, 22 n.103 (1991) (noting that in the Nicaragua case, the International
Court of Justice held that article 2(4) is a part of customary international law).
35. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See Bazyler, supra note 24, at 575 (declaring that ex-
cept for self-defense purposes, article 2 was usually construed as a complete prohibition
on the unilateral use of force by states) (quoting Farooq Hassan, Realpolitik in Inter-
national Law: After Tanzanian-Ugandan Conflict "Humanitarian Intervention" Reex-
amined, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 859, 883 (1981).
36. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
37. U.N.A., supra note 12, at 2. In addition, intervention for purposes of protecting
nationals or for humanitarian reasons occurred under the norms of customary interna-
tional law. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing intervention for
the protection of nationals).
38. M. Sornarajah, Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian Intervention, II GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 45, 58-60 (1981); Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19,
at 72.
39. See Reply, supra note 22, at 241 (listing the following scholars as concluding
that article 2(4) does not constitute an unequivocal ban against all unilateral interven-
tions for humanitarian purposes: McDougal, Reisman, Stone, Goldie, Lauterpacht,
J.N. Moore, and Nanda).
40. Reisman & McDougal, supra note 17, at 177; Reply, supra note 22, at 240.
41. Reisman & McDougal, supra note 17, at 177; Reply, supra note 22, at 237;
Int'l Law Perspective, supra note 1, at 77. But see Brownlie, supra note 30, at 222
(stating that international law scholars dispute this view).
42. The Charter refers to human rights in five provisions. Article 1(3) cites the
promotion and respect for human rights as one of the purposes of the Charter. U.N.
[VOL. 7:881
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tion-they are regarded as supporting a contextual reading 3 of the
proscription on the use of force, balancing the latter against the protec-
tion of human rights." Thus, if force were used for purposes consistent
with the spirit of the United Nations, such as intervention to uphold
human rights, no conflict would exist.4
5
On the other hand, strict adherents to the prohibition on the use of
force hold a contrary view of the phrases regarding territorial integrity
and political independence, contending that they were intentionally in-
cluded due to smaller nations' concerns over the sanctity of their terri-
tory and political independence.46 Similarly, strict constructionists read
CHARTER art. 1, 1 3. Article 13(1)(b) lists the realization of human rights as one of the
purposes for which the General Assembly may initiate studies and make recommenda-
tions. Id. art. 13, % (1)(b). Article 55(c) states that the United Nations should promote
universal regard for and observance of human rights without discrimination as to lan-
guage, race, sex, or religion. Id. art. 55, c. Article 62(2) empowers the Economic and
Social Council to make recommendations to encourage respect for and attention to
human rights standards. Id. art. 62, 2. Article 68 allows the Economic and Social
Council to create commissions to promote human rights. Id. art. 68, 2.
43. See W.D. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention under International Law, 32
NETH. INT'L L. REv. 357, 378 (1985) (adding that the preamble to the Charter makes
article 2(4)'s prohibitions on the use of armed force qualified due to its exception for
force in the collective interest).
44. Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human
Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
THE UNITED NATIONS 197, 200-201 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973) [hereinafter Forci-
ble Self-Help]. See also Reisman & McDougal, supra note 17, at 177 (affirming that
humanitarian intervention, far from inconsistent with the purposes of the United Na-
tions, conforms to the most fundamental principles of the Charter and constitutes a
vindication of international law as well as effective enforcement); Sornarajah, supra
note 38, at 60 (finding that the protection of fundamental human rights constitutes a
purpose of the United Nations Charter which many United Nations organizations have
pursued vigorously and that an unconditional ban on the use of force excepting self-
defense or Chapter VII enforcement would be tantamount to disregarding basic human
rights); Tf-SON, supra note 20, at 153 (concluding that the United Nations' purpose of
supporting and encouraging human rights as stated in article 1(3) and indirectly in
article 2(4)'s prohibition on the use of force is superior to the mandates of state
sovereignty).
45. See TsoN, supra note 20, at 153 (finding that force utilized in the enforce-
ment of basic human rights is not incongruous with the purposes of the United Nations
as set forth in the Charter); id. at 131 (stating that because the promotion of human
rights is a principal purpose of the United Nations, coercive measures to uphold human
rights furthers that purpose). See also id. at 134 (noting that a suggestion to exclude
the qualifying phrase in article 2(4), which refers to the purposes of the United Na-
tions, was rejected when the Charter was being developed). But see id. at 136 (explain-
ing that the travaux prkparatoires of the United Nations Charter can be construed
both ways on this issue and no single interpretation is determinative).
46. See Jhabvala, supra note 20, at 215 (finding that the preparatory materials to
the United Nations Charter, which under traditional rules of treaty interpretation may
be analyzed when the meaning of the language in a document is not clear, show that
the impetus for the phrase referring to the use of force directed against the territorial
integrity or political independence of a state, resulted from smaller states' concerns
regarding protection from interference by larger powers); Brownlie. supra note 30. at
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
article 2(4)'s concluding phrase regarding the purposes of the United
Nations as explicitly prohibiting the use of force and ruling out any
escape clauses.,7
Despite these prohibitions on the use of force resulting from the es-
tablishment of the United Nations, various international legal scholars
continue to recognize the right of states to intervene, absent United
Nations authority, when gross violations of human rights occur.4 Pub-
licists customarily employ three distinct arguments when justifying uni-
lateral humanitarian intervention:49 (1) a literal reading of article 2(4);
(2) a focus on the failure of the United Nations collective security ap-
222-23 (noting that smaller states requested the inclusion of the phrase referring to
territorial integrity because they desired tougher protections against intervention).
47. See Customary Intl Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 63 (quoting Wehberg,
L'Interdiction du Recours a la Force, 78 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIlE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 7, 70 (1951)) (stating that the phrase prohibiting the use of force in
any aspect contrary to the purposes in the United Nations Charter was purposely in-
tended to leave no loopholes); see also Roger S. Clark, Humanitarian Intervention:
Help To Your Friends and State Practice, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COmP. L. 211, 211
(1983) (finding that the preparatory work of the Charter disproves any theory about
such loopholes).
48. See Bazyler, supra note 24, at 576 & n.130 (explaining that T6son, Fonteyne,
Lillich, Reisman and McDougal support the unilateral doctrine of humanitarian
intervention).
49. Customary Int7 Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 72. Nearly all legal scholars
who have written on the topic of humanitarian intervention have formulated a set of
criteria by which to determine whether a particular situation justifies intervention. See
Reisman & McDougal, supra note 17, at 187 (arguing that the post-United Nations
conditions for humanitarian intervention include a particular limited purpose, a re-
stricted time period for the project, a circumscribed use of forcible means, and the
absence of any other options); Reply, supra note 22, at 248 (stating that the tests by
which such an intervention should be assessed include the urgency and extent of the
human rights violations, the presence of an invitation by proper officials, the amount of
coercion utilized, and the relative impartiality of the intervening state); Bazyler, supra
note 24, at 598-607 (suggesting that five factors be considered: large-scale atrocities,
overriding humanitarian motive, preference for collective action, limited intervention,
and exhaustion of peaceful remedies); Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at
76-83 (explaining that the criteria incorporate the characteristics of the situation, the
motivation of the intervening state, the proportionality of the intervention, the exhaus-
tion of peaceful alternatives, the importance of collective action, and the immediate
reporting to an international organization); U.N.A., supra note 12, at 11 (stating that
criteria for armed humanitarian intervention embraces, among other requirements, im-
mobilization of the Security Council, exhaustion of peaceful remedies, and the diversity
of the intervention force); Sornarajah, supra note 38, at 73 (announcing that the doc-
trine as applied to the Indian intervention in Bangladesh displays sensible rules which
limit the exercise of humanitarian intervention); Verwey, supra note 43, at 418 (sug-
gesting that the intervenors submit proof to the United Nations of compliance with
seven conditions of legality for humanitarian intervention). To summarize, an interven-
tion, in order to be truly humanitarian, should satisfy the following requirements:
1. The human rights violations must be immediate. Self-Help, supra note 26, at 347.
2. The force must be proportionate to the danger. Id. at 349.
3. The force must be limited to ongoing or imminent large-scale deprivations of the
most fundamental human rights. See Bazyler, supra note 24, at 598 (stating that the
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paratus; and (3) an emphasis on human rights as one of the primary
purposes of the United Nations.50 The first proposition relates to the
previous discussion of article 2(4) and the United Nations prohibitions
on the use of force.5
The second consideration focuses on the ineffectiveness of United
Nations enforcement measures. 52 Multilateral humanitarian interven-
tion under the auspices of the United Nations is clearly preferable to
unilateral intervention, whether by one state or a group of states.5 3 In-
ternational participation in the decision to intervene reduces the
probability that the action will be motivated by self-interest.4 How-
ever, because no enforcement measures were established under the
United Nations collective security system to force compliance with the
duty to support and promote human rights,55 proponents assert that
states revert to a pre-Charter customary international legal right of hu-
manitarian intervention.5 6 Inasmuch as United Nations member-states
government must kill, threaten to kill, or act so recklessly as to result in the death of a
substantial number of its own people).
4. The intervenor must be relatively disinterested, but other motives will not invalidate
the intervention if humanitarian concerns constitute the overriding motive. Self-Help,
supra note 26, at 350. See also Bazyler, supra note 24, at 601 (admonishing the inter-
vening power to avoid territorial, political, or economic gain as much as possible).
5. All peaceful means must be exhausted before intervening with force. However,
under extreme circumstances where other options would be futile, this requirement
may be waived. Id. at 606-07.
50. See Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 72 (indicating that the
combination of these three arguments constitutes the most common justification for
intervention).
51. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (explaining that as long as the
force is not directed at the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, it
does not fall within article 2(4)'s ban).
52. See Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 58 (explaining that the
United Nations did not act to quell the violence in Biafra, Indonesia, the Sudan.
Burundi, Bangladesh, and Uganda, for example).
53. See Customary Int'l Law Doctrine. supra note 19, at 83 (supporting collective
operations as preferable to individual action); Self-Help, supra note 26, at 345 n.116
(stating that international participation is favored over self-help); James A.R.
Nafziger, Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a Community of
Power, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 9, 26 (1991) (indicating that the majority of
scholars favor multilateral over unilateral intervention).
54. Intervention, supra note 25, at 210.
55. See Self-Help, supra note 26, at 334, 345 (commenting that the United Na-
tions has not adequately established effective enforcement procedures for human
rights); Roger Myers, A New Remedy for Northern Ireland: The Case for United Na-
tions Peacekeeping Intervention in an Internal Conflict, II N.Y. L. SCH. J. lNr'L &
Comp. L. 1, 116 (1990) (noting that a permanent armed United Nations force has
never been created).
56. Self-Help, supra note 26, at 344; TtsoN, supra note 20, at 137-38, Customary
Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 75. See also Jhabvala, supra note 20, at 215
(noting and critiquing the argument that article 2(4) prohibits United Nations mem-
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demanded the establishment of enforcement provisions in exchange for
surrendering their customary right to use force, the failure of the
United Nations collective security apparatus relieves them of their duty
of restraint under the Charter.57 Judge Jessup, a noted international
legal commentator and supporter of collective over unilateral interven-
tion, concluded that the incapacity of an international organization to
quickly mobilize in order to protect the victims of human rights trans-
gressions serves as the only conceivable argument against substitution
of Security Council collective action in place of unilateral action by
single states.58
According to the third argument for humanitarian intervention, pro-
ponents contend that the very principles and purposes upon which the
United Nations was founded, particularly the support and promotion of
human rights throughout the world, justify the defense of humanitarian
intervention.59 Some supporters of the doctrine point to the fact that
while article 2(4) is an important provision of the Charter, it is a single
principle competing with other significant Charter goals, such as the
advancement of human rights.60 The preamble and first article of the
Charter make clear that the framers intended to link international
peace and security with fundamental human rights."' The Charter's
preamble expresses the determination of the members to uphold essen-
tial human rights and to make certain that armed force is only utilized
for the collective good.62 Through this reasoning, the use of force in
support of the common interest, such as for humanitarian purposes,
bers from using force except in self-defense only on the condition that the collective
system allowed for by the Charter is put into practice).
57. Bazyler, supra note 24, at 579 (quoting Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Custom-
ary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity
under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 257 n.231 (1974)). This article was the
precursor to the 1980 article referred to in note 19.
58. Reply, supra note 22, at 238 & n.61 (quoting PHILIP JESSUP, A MODERN LAW
OF NATIONS 170 (1949)).
59. Reisman & McDougal, supra note 17, at 171.
60. See Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 73-74 (considering article
2(4) in the context of the broader purposes of the Charter and concluding that the
restrictions on the use of force and the support of human rights must be balanced). See
also Reisman & McDougal, supra note 17, at 172, 175 (concluding that by examining
the dominant purposes in the preamble and articles 1, 55, and 56, the Charter allows
for humanitarian intervention in various configurations: the members may act jointly
with the United Nations, constituting an expressly statutory intervention; or individu-
ally or cooperatively under customary humanitarian intervention).
61. Reisman & McDougal, supra note 17, at 171. See also Response, supra note
22, at 442 (citing the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as em-
phasizing the United Nations Charter's conceptualization of the indivisibility of human
rights and international security).
62. U.N. CHARTER pmbl., 11 2, 7.
[VOL. 7:881
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
may be lawful.6 3 Other provisions in the Charter support this conclu-
sion. Article 1(3) states that one of the purposes of the United Nations
is the achievement of international cooperation in furthering respect for
human rights." Furthermore, article 55 reaffirms that the United Na-
tions shall promote comprehensive support and observance of funda-
mental human rights, 5 and article 5666 contains a pledge by member
states to act individually and collectively with the United Nations to
accomplish the purposes set out in article 55.67 Against this setting, the
establishment of the Charter neither extinguished nor disabled the cus-
tomary international legal right of humanitarian intervention. 8
Notwithstanding these three arguments in support of humanitarian
intervention, one of the recurring criticisms of unilateral intervention is
the concern that if international law sanctioned the right to intervene,
it would remain the tool of a handful of powerful states. 9 Regardless
of whether humanitarian intervention is used as a pretext,7 0 interven-
tion by powerful nations will inevitably occur; the operative difference
is that without the doctrine of humanitarian intervention states will
merely cloak their self-interested actions in other politically-correct jus-
63. See Reisman & McDougal, supra note 17, at 172 (stating that the use of force
to protect human rights is as valid as other types of self-help, as demonstrated by the
numerous references to the common interest in human rights in the preamble).
64. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 3. See also LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL, CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONs 34 (3d. rev. ed. 1969) (noting that the Charter's authors
sought to advance human welfare through international teamwork).
65. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, V c.
66. U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
67. Id. Article 56 states that "[a]ll members pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the pur-
poses set forth in Article 55." Id. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 739-40 (postulat-
ing that it is inconceivable that members of the United Nations have no obligation to
uphold and observe human rights and fundamental freedoms, one of the main purposes
of the organization, particularly in light of the dictates of article 56); Thomas Bu-
ergenthal, Domestic Jurisdiction. Intervention, and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 111, 115 (Peter G. Brown & Douglas MacLean eds., 1979)
(concluding that member states have a legal duty to act individually and collectively in
conjunction with the United Nations to encourage fundamental human rights).
68. See Reisman & McDougal, supra note 17, at 171 (maintaining that the Char-
ter bolstered and expanded the boundaries of humanitarian intervention).
69. See Franck & Rodley, supra note 21, at 290 (finding that powerful states
would use the doctrine as an excuse for invading weaker nations). But cf. Self-Help,
supra note 26, at 347 (emphasizing that intervention does not occur in a vacuum but is
subject to evaluation and criticism by the community of nations).
70. See Nafziger, supra note 53, at 25 (noting that humanitarian intervention can
easily disguise the unlawful use of force); Lee H. Hamilton, When It's Our Duty to
Intervene; In Cases Like Bosnia, the U.N. Must Alter Its Presumption Against War-
fare, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1992, at C2 (observing that several nations have expressed
concern that the weakening of the proscriptions against intervention will cause in-
creased interference, obscured as humanitarian intervention).
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tifications7 1 In addition, while some scholars doubt the value of prece-
dent of previous interventions justified by humanitarian concerns, 2 the
United Nations has never clearly condemned any of the applications of
the doctrine. 3 Moreover, even opponents of the doctrine concede that
in certain circumstances humanitarian intervention in outrageous cases
of human rights violations could be justified as an exception to the
broad prohibitions on the use of force.74
Thus, the disagreement among legal scholars today is between those
who embrace a codified, affirmative right to humanitarian interven-
tion7 5 and those who uphold the absolute prohibition on the use of force
but condone humanitarian intervention only as an exceptional remedy
for extreme cases of violence and deprivation. 6 It is unclear whether
there would be a significant difference between a positive codified right
subject to well-defined criteria and a clearly conscripted exception to
the prohibition on the use of force." While the use of force should not
be brazenly invoked against the sovereign independence of states,
neither should states passively observe the massacre of thousands or
71. R. George Wright, A Contemporary Theory of Humanitarian Intervention, 4
FLA. INT'L L.J. 435, 441 (1989). See also Roger P. Winter, How the United Nations
Balances Concerns for Sovereignty and Suffering, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of
the Conference on Washington Representatives on the United Nations 4 (Aug. 6,
1991) (transcript available at The American University Journal of International Law
and Policy) (observing that powerful states will intervene whenever it is in their inter-
est regardless of the justification); Self-Help, supra note 26, at 347 (quoting M. Mc-
DOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 416 (1961))
(maintaining that while the doctrine of humanitarian intervention may be subject to
abuse, this problem is endemic to all legal norms and policies).
72. See Franck & Rodley, supra note 21, at 282 & n.32 (stating that Brownlie
cites the 1860 French intervention in Syria as the only genuine case of humanitarian
intervention, and contending further that even the Syrian example does not satisfy close
scrutiny).
73. Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 65 n.185.
74. See Franck & Rodley, supra note 21, at 304 (conceding that humanitarian
intervention could comprise a suitable response to some situations, but noting that this
choice is a moral, rather than a legal, issue); Brownlie, supra note 30, at 227 (support-
ing an exception with carefully scripted requirements to the prohibitions on the use of
force where the operation's results are not disproportionate to the original objective).
75. See Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 68 (advocating a clearly
delineated rule which would restrict intervention to specified cases).
76. See Brownlie, supra note 30, at 227 (advocating an exception rather than an
affirmative legal right to intervene); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 28, at
64 (statement of Professor Franck) (stating that maintaining the doctrine as an unwrit-
ten exception to the Charter prohibition on the use of force is better than spelling out
criteria); Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 41 (asserting that while
many writers refuse to allow the doctrine to attain the status of a formal legal justifica-
tion they acknowledge that intervention, technically a breach of the law, could be laud-
able in certain cases).
77. Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 68.
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millions of innocent people.7 8 Nevertheless, multilateral7 action under
United Nations authorization is overwhelmingly preferable to unilat-
eral intervention even if the situation ostensibly meets specified criteria
for unilateral action.80 The remainder of this Comment focuses on
strengthening the prospects for multilateral humanitarian intervention
within the confines and restrictions of the United Nations Charter.
III. THE SECURITY COUNCIL: CHAPTER VII
ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS, MEMBERSHIP, AND THE
VETO
While article 2(4) precludes the threat or use of force by states di-
rected at the territorial integrity or political independence of other
states,81 article 2(7)82 regulates interference by the United Nations in a
state's domestic affairs.8 3 Article 2(7) prohibits the United Nations
from interfering in the domestic jurisdiction8" of any state except when
the Security Council undertakes Chapter VII 85 enforcement mea-
sures."6 This latter part of article 2(7) exempts from the domestic juris-
diction limitation situations where the Security Council deems that a
78. See Self-Help, supra note 26, at 344 (concluding that to demand that states
idly stand by while innocent people are brutalized simply in order to comply with the
ban against the use of force would elevate blackletter law at the cost of far more signif-
icant principles).
79. See HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 28, at 88 (statement of Profes-
sor Weston) (stating that the more multilateral characteristics an operation has, the
less politicized it becomes).
80. See HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 28, at 107 (statement of Pro-
fessor Frey-Wouters) (maintaining that while unilateral intervention by force may oc-
cur in certain rare and genocidal cases, international law need not embrace or further
unilateral action).
81. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
82. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
83. Id.; Customary Int7 Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 59.
84. See generally Myers, supra note 55, at 69-70 (noting that two General Assem-
bly declarations reinforced the prohibition against United Nations action in matters of
domestic jurisdiction). The first resolution was the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Indepen-
dence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11-
12, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); the second was the Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accor-
dance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th
Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121-24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
85. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. Chapter VII is entitled "Actions With Respect to
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression."
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7. Article 2(7) states: "[niothing contained in the pre-
sent Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are es-
sentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state ... but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." Id. See infra
notes 88-96 and accompanying text (describing Chapter VII enforcement provisions).
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state's human rights violations constitute a threat to the peace under
Chapter VII enforcement powers.8" The Charter grants the Security
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security.88 Chapter VII enforcement powers establish that
the Security Council has the authority to make the threshold determi-
nation of whether a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression exists.89 The Security Council must then take appropriate
action with regard to articles 41 and 42.90 Article 41 authorizes the use
of measures short of armed force including the disruption of diplomatic
relations and the imposition of economic sanctions.9" Article 41 also
gives the Security Council the power to demand that United Nations
members effectuate such actions.92 Article 42 enables the Security
Council to use armed force to preserve or restore international peace
and security if the measures enumerated in article 41 are or would be
ineffective.
93
Whereas the General Assembly possesses only the power to recom-
mend, the Security Council is empowered to make binding decisions
under Chapter VII.94 The finding of a threat to the peace, breach of
87. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, T 7. See Myers, supra note 55, at 69 n.345 (explaining
that under article 2(7), the United Nations may apply enforcement measures against a
state irrespective of whether the issue triggering the need for such measures is encom-
passed within the state's domestic jurisdiction); Paul C. Szasz, Role of the United Na-
tions in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 345, 351 (1983) (noting that
article 2(7)'s prohibition on United Nations interference in the domestic jurisdiction of
states, when linked to internal conflicts, is based upon nebulous notions of what consti-
tutes a threat to peace and security, the degree of human rights deprivations involved,
and the dimensions of the conflict).
88. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1.
89. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. See generally SYDNEY D. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 295 (2d. ed. 1988) (observing that there is no definition
in the United Nations Charter of what is considered a threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression); GOODRICH, supra note 64, at 295.
90. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
91. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
92. Id.
93. U.N. CHARTER art. 42. Cf. Self-Help, supra note 26, at 338 (finding that
under article 2(7), the United Nations possesses the legal right to utilize force when it
determines that the state violating human rights standards actually causes a threat to
the peace).
94. See BAILEY, supra note 89, at 241-42 (stating that Security Council action
taken under Chapter VII is binding on all members); Christopher J. Sabec, The Secur-
ity Council Comes of Age: An Analysis of the International Legal Response to the
Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 21 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 63, 83 (1991) (concluding that
Security Council decisions under Chapter VII are binding); U.N. CHARTER art. 25
(requiring that member states abide by and execute decisions of the Security Council
in accordance with the Charter); RICHARD HISCOCKS, THE SECURITY COUNCIL: A
STUDY IN ADOLESCENCE 291 (1973) (contrasting the General Assembly's power to rec-
ommend with the Security Council's power to make binding decisions).
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the peace, or act of aggression is a precondition to the exercise of
Chapter VII enforcement powersY6 Consequently, when human rights
violations are found to constitute a threat to the peace, the Security
Council has jurisdiction and is entrusted with the power to take ac-
tion.16 One significant obstacle is that unanimity of the five permanent
members is required to identify a threat to the peace and one veto can
prevent such a determination."' Because the composition of the Secur-
ity Council and the existence of the veto power are inherently related
to the Council's effectiveness in carrying out the purposes of the Char-
ter, some background on Council membership and voting procedures
will prove helpful.
The Security Council is composed of five permanent members:
China, France, the Soviet Union"8 (whose seat has been assumed by
the Russian Federation), the United Kingdom, and the United States.9
These permanent members have continuous membership on the Secur-
ity Council and are vested with the right to veto substantive decisions
of the Council and amendments to the United Nations Charter.100 Ten
non-permanent members are elected 01 by the General Assembly for
two-year terms 10 2 and such members are not accorded the veto power.
Decisions relating to substantive, non-procedural issues require nine af-
firmative votes, 103 including the concurrence' 0 ' of all five permanent
95. GOODRICH, supra note 64, at 293.
96. Reisman & McDougal, supra note 17, at 175; Brownlie, supra note 30, at 226.
97. Alissa Pyrich, Recent Developments, UNITED NATIONS: Authorizations of
Use of Force, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 265, 269 (1991).
98. While the Soviet Union no longer exists, this article occasionally refers to the
term in order to provide historical accuracy. For instance, article 23 of the Charter
refers to the U.S.S.R. as a permanent member of the Security Council. U.N. CHARTER
art. 23, $ 1. However, the Russian Federation asserted its claim to the Soviet Union's
seat on December 27, 1991. See Russia's Flag Makes its Debut at United Nations,
L.A. TimEs, Dec. 28, 1991, at A8 (stating that the Soviet Union's seat on the Security
Council was transferred to the Russian Federation).
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 23, 1.
100. BAILEY, supra note 89, at 107.
101. See generally U.N. CHARTER art. 23, I (indicating that a state's contribu-
tion to the support of international peace and security along with equitable geographi-
cal distribution are primary factors to consider in the election of non-permanent mem-
bers). See also W. Michael Reisman, The Case of the Nonpermanent Vacancy, 74 A,%l.
J. INT'L L. 907, 907 n.2 (1980) [hereinafter Vacancy] (declaring that geographical
distribution comprises the most politically significant factor for the General Assembly
to consider in electing non-permanent members).
102. U.N. CHARTER art. 23, 2. See also id. (stating that the non-permanent
members cannot be immediately re-elected).
103. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, % 3. The Charter provisions relating to voting in the
Security Council, commonly known as the Yalta formula, were established by the
United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. BAILEY, supra note 89, at 198.
104. Abstention by a permanent member is not considered to be equivalent to a
veto. BAILEY, supra note 89, at 225; Vacancy, supra note 101, at 908; see Burns H.
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members. 10 5 Decisions on procedural matters require an affirmative
vote of any nine members." 6 Enlargement of the Security Council re-
quires amendment of the Charter. 10 7 In order for an amendment to
become binding, the General Assembly must adopt it by a two-thirds
vote.'08 In addition, two-thirds of the United Nations member states,
including all five permanent members of the Security Council, must
ratify the amendment. 0 9 The Charter was amended in 1963110 after
the General Assembly passed a resolution to increase the size of the
Council from ten to fifteen seats, allowing for five additional non-per-
manent members."'
While one of the fundamentals of the Charter is that all members
are deemed equal," 2 this theoretical principle does not reflect the prac-
tical reality that only five members of the Security Council possess the
potent veto power. 1 3 During the formation of the United Nations nu-
merous states initially hoped to eliminate the veto but quickly under-
stood that it was a precondition to ensuring the very existence of the
United Nations." 4 The veto power was the cost that less influential
Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precari-
ous Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 523 n.44 (1991) (finding that notwithstanding
the language of article 27(3) which refers to the requirement of concurring votes, a
voluntary abstention is not comparable to a veto).
105. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 1 3; BAILEY, supra note 89, at 199.
106. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, 1 2.
107. BAILEY, supra note 89, at 118.
108. U.N. CHARTER art. 108.
109. Id.; see generally U.N. CHARTER art. 109, 1 1 (providing that a Charter re-
view conference may be held when two-thirds of the General Assembly and any nine
members of the Security Council so desire).
110. See HISCOCKS, supra note 94, at 98 (explaining that the changes became ef-
fective in 1965).
111. See generally BAILEY, supra note 89, at 119 (stating that the General Assem-
bly distributed the ten elective seats among four geographic regions: five for African
and Asian states; two for Latin Americans; two for West Europeans and others; and
one for Eastern Europeans); Jaskaran S. Teja, Expansion of the Security Council and
its Consensus Procedure, 16 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 349, 350-51 (1969) (declaring that
the Resolution established for the first time a clear distribution of non-permanent seats
among four geographic areas). China voted in favor of the resolution, the Soviet Union
and France against it, and the United States and Britain abstained. Id. at 351. The
Soviets later decided to support the amendment. Id.
112. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1.
113. BAILEY, supra note 89, at 111. See also ARTHUR LALL, THE SECURITY COUN-
CIL IN A UNIVERSAL UNITED NATIONS 12 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, 1971)
(noting that a hierarchy exists in the Security Council between permanent and non-
permanent members and explaining that the latter's views are represented peripherally
at best).
114. BAILEY, supra note 89, at 200. See also SYDNEY D. BAILEY, VOTING IN THE
SECURITY COUNCIL 101-02 (1969) [hereinafter VOTING] (concluding that the United
Nations might never have come into existence or continued to exist without the assign-
ment of veto rights to the major powers). Many states who originally accepted the veto
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nations paid for the inclusion of the five major powers in the new col-
lective security system. 15 The veto privilege guaranteed that no major
action could be undertaken without the consent of all five permanent
members and that this power could never be changed unless all five
agreed to amend it." 6 It is important to recall, however, that the Char-
ter was drafted under conditions drastically different from the pre-
sent;11 the founders assumed the wartime alliance would endure and
that the five permanent members would serve as global policemen.",
The veto power remains one of the most significant obstacles to the
effective workings of the Security Council." 8 As a result of their spe-
cial privilege, the five permanent members, with their disproportionate
power and singular interests, have precluded the Security Council from
acting according to the purposes of the United Nations. 20 One veto by
a permanent member negates affirmative votes by all the other mem-
bers of the Council.12' Not surprisingly, when a breach or threat to the
peace affects a permanent member or one of its allies, the veto power
power, however, hoped that it would be reassessed and possibly abolished at some point
in time. GOODRICH, supra note 64, at 639. Numerous complaints were raised when the
special privilege was included in the process of amending the Charter. Id.
115. FRANCIS 0. WILCOX & CARL M. MARCY, PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE
UNITED NATIONS 311 (1955).
116. Id. See also Norman J. Padelford, The Use of the Veto, 2 INT'L ORG. 227,
228 (1948) (maintaining that each wanted to preclude the United Nations from au-
thorizing action adverse to their national interests).
117. See LALL, supra note 113, at 3 (observing that if an international conference
took place at present the San Francisco membership and voting formula would most
likely not be accepted).
118. See Sir Crispen Tickell, The Role of the Security Council in World Affairs,
18 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307, 307-08 (1988) (noting that the Charter was based
upon the continued cooperation of the major victorious powers of World War II);
Padelford, supra note 116, at 228 (stating that the founders assumed the great powers
would continue working together in the preservation of peace and security): Sabec,
supra note 94, at 96 (recognizing that the collective security system intended by the
drafters relied on the continued agreement of the five permanent members, but reality
did not reflect this vision and Chapter VII became ineffectual).
119. See Arend, supra note 34, at 7 (finding that the veto has impeded almost all
possible Security Council actions against aggression); Padelford, supra note 116, at 246
(noting that criticism of the veto power's effect on Security Council performance was
evident just three years after the establishment of the Charter). The veto gave rise to
pressures to amend the Charter or find alternative ways of limiting its use. Id.
120. BAILEY, supra note 89, at 160. See also id. (suggesting that the purpose of the
veto is to prevent action from occurring, not to encourage cooperation among the per-
manent members). But see VOTING, supra note 114, at 62 (contending that the veto
has not hampered the United Nations as much as critics have asserted).
121. Tarlok S. Batra, Research Notes, Veto Power of the Security Council, 18
INDIAN J. INT'L L. 76, 78 (1978). From 1966 to 1986 the five permanent members
exercised 119 vetoes. See BAILEY, supra note 89, at 209 (stating that this included 57
by the United States, 23 by the United Kingdom, 21 by China, 18 by the Soviet Union,
and 12 by France).
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forestalls any action. 2 Examples of this type of occurrence include the
1980 Soviet veto of a draft resolution criticizing the invasion of Af-
ghanistan;' 21 the United States veto of a similar resolution regarding
the mining of Nicaraguan ports; 24 the United States veto of an en-
deavor to condemn the invasion of Panama; 2 5 and the triple veto with
regard to Rhodesia in 1977.126 At the same time, when an act of ag-
gression has no impact upon a permanent member's own interest, no
action is taken and collective security becomes a casualty of state
indifference.1
2 7
During most of the major crises since 1945 the Security Council has
been deadlocked 28 and impotent. 2 ' The Uniting for Peace Resolu-
122. O'Connell, supra note 34, at 453 n.3 (quoting YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AG-
GRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 268-69 (1988)). See also Pyrich, supra note 97, at 270
(declaring that permanent members will veto resolutions that criticize aggressive ac-
tions by themselves or their allies); LALL, supra note 113, at 8 (noting that the perma-
nent members act only when their interests are compatible with the action being
taken); Arend, supra note 34, at 9 n.40 (concluding that the United Nations does not
comprise a true collective security arrangement because the permanent members can
veto enforcement actions and thus are not subject to sanctions when they commit ag-
gressive acts); Batra, supra note 121, at 78 (finding that whenever a permanent mem-
ber is involved in a dispute either directly or indirectly by supporting the aggressive
state, the enforcement system collapses as a result of the veto power). Particularly if
one presumes that the most powerful nations constitute the most serious threat to world
peace, the collective security provisions cannot act against the major powers, and are
thus total failures. Pyrich, supra note 97, at 270 n.37. But cf. HiscocKs, supra note
94, at 294 (stating that enforcement action was not intended by the Charter to be
applied against a permanent member).
123. Pyrich, supra note 97, at 270 n.36.
124. Pyrich, supra note 97, at 270 n.36.
125. Sabec, supra note 94, at 69 n.31.
126. See N.P. Jain, U.N. Charter in a Changing World Situation, 18 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 284, 287 (1978) (criticizing the Southern Rhodesia case as an unjustified and
arbitrary use of the veto power).
127. See Arend, supra note 34, at 9 & n.42 (citing as examples the Indonesian
invasion of East Timor in 1975 and Morocco's seizure of the Western Sahara in that
same year).
128. By passing three resolutions, the General Assembly attempted to limit the
veto power in order to avoid such deadlock in the early history of the United Nations.
HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 277-79 (1951). The first Resolution
requested permanent members to try to ensure that the veto power did not hinder the
Council from making prompt decisions. G.A. Res. 40, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.l, at 64
(1946). The second Resolution requested that the Council members confer with each
other on the problem of voting and agree on measures to guarantee swift and effective
execution of Council functions. G.A. Res. 117, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 23 (1947). The
third Resolution recommended that the permanent members agree to restrain the veto
power and to only use it when the question was of crucial consequence to the United
Nations as a whole. G.A. Res. 267, U.N. Doc. A/900, at 7-8 (1948). See also GOOD-
RICH, supra note 64, at 645 (finding that the 1947 proposal that the General Assembly
sponsor a conference to study the veto power "with a view to its abolition" was not
voted upon but was referred to the Assembly's Interim Committee, which recom-
mended that the Assembly assess whether it was an appropriate time to call for a
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tion, 13° adopted by the General Assembly in 1950, is further evidence
of the Security Council's unresponsiveness,131 largely due to the veto
power. The United States designed the Resolution in order to bypass
the Soviet veto of United Nations intervention in Korea. 1 2 The United
States realized that the unforeseen absence of the Soviet representative
presented the only opportunity for the Security Council to take action
review conference). The proposal to call such a conference, however, was not successful
at the next Assembly session. Id.
129. Thomas M. Franck, United Nations Based Prospects for a New Global Order,
22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 601, 614 (1990); see also KELSEN, supra note 128, at
277 (noting that this disabling effect of the veto power has created a movement to
revise article 27(3), which requires the concurrence of the permanent members on sub-
stantive matters, but observing that it is unlikely they will allow the Charter to be
amended); Tickell, supra note 118, at 311 (determining that the actual record of the
Council is inconsistent with the intent of the drafters who envisioned five permanent
members working together to uphold international peace and security under Chapter
VII). But see id. at 312 (maintaining that the veto power has been a vital component of
the system since the beginning and that without it countless resolutions would have
been passed, resulting in disregard of the Council altogether).
130. G.A. Res. 377A, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 10-12, U.N. Doc.
A/1775 (1950) [hereinafter Uniting for Peace]. The Resolution provides in pertinent
part:
The General Assembly...
Conscious that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities
on behalf of all the Member States . . . does not relieve Member States of their
obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to main-
tain international peace and security...
1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General As-
sembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a
breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary,
to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the
time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within
twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall
be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members,
or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations.
Id. at 10. See Vacancy, supra note 101, at 911 (noting that the Resolution authorizes
the recommendation of armed force only for a breach of the peace or act of aggression,
not a threat to the peace).
131. See HISCOCKS, supra note 94, at 292 (declaring that the Resolution was an
explicit statement of disappointment and disenchantment with the Security Council);
WILCOX & MARCY, supra note 115, at 142 (observing that while some view the Reso-
lution as eliminating the veto for collective security, others view it as a misleading
suggestion that the permanent members are not essential for effective collective secur-
ity measures and that General Assembly recommendations enjoy the same authority as
binding Security Council decisions). But cf. LALL, supra note 113, at 28 (contending
that the Resolution resulted from the Cold War, not from more fundamental criticisms
of Security Council structure and process).
132. VOTING, supra note 114, at 50.
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in Korea. 133 Under the Resolution, in the event that the Security Coun-
cil cannot exercise its Chapter VII powers due to lack of agreement
among the permanent members, the General Assembly becomes opera-
tive and is granted the power to execute the duties and powers of the
Security Council, including, if necessary, the recommendation of armed
force.134 The Uniting for Peace Resolution established a standard pro-
cedure whereby the General Assembly could meet in emergency session
when the veto created a stalemate. 35 Historically, stalemate among the
five permanent members was more the rule than the exception; in addi-
tion to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the only other case where the per-
manent members agreed to use military force under United Nations
authorization was Korea,1 36 which was only possible because the Soviet
representative was absent and unable to exercise the veto power.
37
The Gulf Crisis provided an opportunity for unprecedented unity
among the permanent members of the Security Council. a' 8 Neverthe-
133. VOTING, supra note 114, at 50.
134. Uniting for Peace, supra note 130. Illustrations include the 1971 India-Paki-
stan war that led to the creation of Bangladesh, where the Soviet veto resulted in dead-
lock of the Security Council and the issue was transferred to the General Assembly
under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. BAILEY, supra note 89, at 245. In addition, the
Resolution was relied upon during the Suez crisis in 1956, during the Hungarian emer-
gency that same year, and during the Congo crisis in 1960. HISCOCKS, supra note 94,
at 292. In two other cases while the Resolution's procedures were not formally followed
the outcome was essentially the same: first, during the Korean War the Security Coun-
cil removed the issue from the agenda, knowing that the permanent members would
not come to a consensus; the General Assembly considered the issue and condemned
China for the aggression. Id. at 292-93. The second instance involved a dispute be-
tween Lebanon, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic in 1958 where the United
States and Soviet Union could not come to agreement and the Council called an emer-
gency session of the General Assembly to consider the matter. Id. at 293.
135. VOTING, supra note 114, at 50.
136. After North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, the Security Council
passed a resolution recommending that members provide assistance to South Korea in
order to repel the invasion and restore the peace. See Arend, supra note 34, at 7 &
n.30 (quoting U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg. at 4, 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.474
(1950)). See id. at 7 (recognizing that while the Resolution was non-binding, it came
the closest to Security Council enforcement action until the United Nations authorized
armed force against Iraq).
137. Pyrich, supra note 97, at 270 n.37; O'Connell, supra note 34, at 455. See also
Arend, supra note 34, at 7 (observing that aside from Iraq the only time the Security
Council utilized force against an offending state occurred when the Soviet Union was
absent from the vote); Tickell, supra note 118, at 308 (declaring that the Cold War
paralyzed the Security Council; the only exception involved the authorization of the
intervention force for South Korea, which was only possible because the Soviet Union
boycotted the Council).
138. Ved P. Nanda, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: The U.N. Response, 15 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 431, 434-35 (1991) [hereinafter Iraqi Invasion]. See id. at 447 (noting that
only one Security Council member, China, abstained from Resolution 678, which sanc-
tioned the use of force to reestablish international peace and security).
[VOL. 7:881
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
less, United States action in the Gulf War is illustrative of the com-
promises that are often necessary to make in order to avoid the devas-
tating effects of the veto power. Numerous concessions which
contradicted fundamental United Nations principles were made to the
Soviet Union and China in return for non-opposition to Resolution 678,
which authorized the use of force against Iraq. 1 9 In order to avoid a
Soviet veto, the United States agreed to exclude Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania from the 1990 Paris summit conference. " ' Moreover, the
United States ignored human rights violations in China and agreed to
withdraw trade sanctions imposed after the slaughter at Tienanmen
Square in order to obtain an abstention, instead of a threatened veto,
from China.' In terms of determining the potency of Resolution 688
as a precedent, however, it is necessary to reexamine the level at which
human rights violations rise to a threat to the peace and to correspond-
ingly reevaluate the evolving norms of sovereignty and noninterven-
tion" in internal affairs.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SOVEREIGNTY, DOMESTIC
JURISDICTION, THREATS TO THE PEACE, AND THE
SECURITY COUNCIL'S ABILITY TO INTERVENE
Resolution 688 was adopted under a unique set of circumstances,""
and no future case is likely to be wholly analogous. 4 Nevertheless, the
139. Weston, supra note 104, at 523-24. See also W. Michael Reisman, Some Les-
sons from Iraq: International Law and Democratic Politics, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 203.
208 (1991) (finding that the United States ignored human rights violations in China,
Syria, and Lithuania in order to keep the coalition together).
140. Weston, supra note 104, at 523.
141. Weston, supra note 104, at 523-24.
142. See Buergenthal, supra note 67, at 113 (finding that the principle of noninter-
vention is based upon the fundamental international legal doctrine of sovereign equality
and independence of states).
143. See U.N.A., supra note 12, at 9 (recognizing that the Resolution was pre-
ceded by a war authorized by the United Nations, world opinion was united in condem-
nation of Saddam Hussein, and Turkey refused to accept Kurdish refugees); Oscar
Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 468-69
(1991) (explaining that additional factors in the Iraqi case included the mass exodus of
Kurds and Shiites into Turkey and Iran, detracting from the purely internal character
of the situation, and the fact that the predicament of the minorities was partly a result
of the military action against Iraq itself, giving the coalition more of an interest in
protecting the victims).
144. See James H. Anderson, 16 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 127, 129 (1992) (find-
ing that not all future situations of serious human rights violations will be preceded by
such unmitigated interstate belligerency). See also U.N.A., supra note 12, at 7 (noting
that the record of the Security Council debates, the particular wording of the Resolu-
tion, and the fact that the Resolution was explicitly not adopted under Chapter VII, all
point away from any blueprint for intervention by force). But see infra notes 166-67
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precedential value of the Resolution should not be understated.14 Res-
olution 688 marked the first time the Security Council authorized a
right to interfere for humanitarian reasons in a state's domestic juris-
diction. 146 With the cessation of the Cold War, the growing interna-
tionalization of human rights standards, and economic challenges tran-
scending national borders, the dictates of sovereignty no longer reign
supreme. In many contexts, severe violations of human rights may con-
stitute a threat147 to the peace, 148 particularly in light of the expanding
and accompanying text (suggesting that the Resolution was created under Chapter VII
enforcement).
145. See U.N.A., supra note 12, at 9 (asserting that the allied deployment estab-
lished a strong precedent in protecting relief workers); Nafziger, supra note 53, at 31
(contending that Resolution 688 forecasted a greater role for humanitarian intervention
under international law); Int'l Law Perspective, supra note 1, at 83 (concluding that
humanitarian intervention persists as an acceptable option as evidenced by the action
undertaken by allied forces to quell the Kurdish crisis); Sharon Waxman, Defender of
the Downtrodden; France's Humanitarian Action Secretary, Helping Victims as Well
as Himself, WASH. PosT, June 10, 1991, at Cl, CIO (stating that for Bernard
Kouchner, French Secretary for Health and Humanitarian Action, the intervention set
an important precedent and the right of humanitarian intervention should be added to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); Douglas Hurd, A Year the World Lived
Dangerously, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 2, 1991, at 14 (finding that Resolution 688
created a significant precedent for mobilization if comparable conditions arise in the
future); RIGHT V. MIGHT, supra note 3, at 129 (stating that the precedents created by
the Security Council during the Gulf War should reinforce the credibility of and confi-
dence in collective security procedures). But cf. Weston, supra note 104, at 517 (assert-
ing that the resolutions undertaken in the Gulf War are of questionable prccedential
value because the United States unilaterally controlled the military force); Schachter,
supra note 143, at 469 (stating that most states would not condone a broad right of
United Nations forceful humanitarian intervention, unless it was authorized under
Chapter VII).
146. Mario Bettati, The Right to Interfere, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1991, at A25.
See also UNHCR Ogata Urges More Aid to Iraqi Refugees, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWS-
WIRE, Apr. 22, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JEN File (quoting United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata as stating that Resolution
688, which permitted humanitarian intervention by United Nations agencies in Iraq,
marked the first time the Security Council recognized large population displacement as
a threat to international peace and security); Nafziger, supra note 53, at 29 (maintain-
ing that Resolution 688 was the first time the Council found that a huge exodus of
refugees or displaced people in their own nation threatened international peace and
security).
147. See Myers, supra note 55, at 97 (declaring that in the situation of strife be-
tween Greek and Turkish Cypriots which caused severe human rights deprivations, the
Security Council considered the situation to be a likely threat to the peace and dis-
patched a peacekeeping force to Cyprus) (emphasis added).
148. See Nafziger, supra note 53, at 31 (finding that widespread human rights
transgressions undeniably threaten international peace and security and trigger Chap-
ter VII authority); Reisman & McDougal, supra note 17, at 172 (concluding that in
an increasingly interdependent world egregious human rights violations may constitute
a threat to the peace); Dennis T. Fenwick, Note, A Proposed Resolution Providing for
the Authorization of Intervention by the United Nations, a Regional Organization, or
a Group of States in a State Committing Gross Violations of Human Rights, 13 VA.
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globalization of human rights norms. 4 ' The Security Council recog-
nized the internal deprivations of human rights in Rhodesia and South
Africa, for example, as constituting a threat to international peace and
security.150 In the 1966 case of Southern Rhodesia, the Security Coun-
cil Resolution reaffirmed that the human rights violations created a
threat to the peace. 5' Accordingly, the Council imposed economic
sanctions and called upon member states to help in the implementation
of the actions called for by the Resolution.5 2 In the 1977 South Africa
Resolution, the Security Council considered government violence
against black citizens to endanger international peace and security, and
thus, imposed a mandatory arms embargo." 3 These cases demonstrate
J. INT'L L. 340, 355 (1973) (quoting Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman,
Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 Ai. J.
INT'L L. 15, 18 (1968)) (declaring that international peace and security and the pro-
tection of human rights are necessarily interconnected and the impact of flagrant viola-
tions of human rights goes beyond national boundaries). What constitutes a threat to
the peace was discussed in an early Security Council debate. GOODRICH, supra note
64, at 296; Myers, supra note 55, at 92 n.484. The British Representative contended
that any "threat to the peace" must be a threat to international peace. GOODRICH,
supra note 64, at 296 (emphasis added). The United States, on the other hand, claimed
that internal disorders could constitute a threat to the peace and stressed that article 39
did not stipulate a threat to international peace. Id. (emphasis added).
149. See Lori F. Damrosch, Commentary on Collective Military Intervention to
Enforce Human Rights, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 215,
217 (Lori F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991) (affirming that when human
rights violations rise to the level of a threat to international peace and security, accord-
ing to Charter articles 2(7) and 39, that threat supersedes state sovereignty); Vladimir
Kartashkin, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND FORCE IN
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 202, 207-08 (Lori F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffer
eds., 1991) (explaining that because several international documents define interna-
tional crimes as encompassing egregious violations of human rights which jeopardize
international peace and security, Chapter VII becomes activated). Contra Tom J.
Farer, An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND
FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 185, 190 (Lori F. Damrosch & David J.
Scheffer eds., 1991) (arguing that there is no indication in the preparatory works to the
United Nations Charter that the parties viewed a state's behavior towards its own citi-
zens as creating a threat to or breach of the peace).
150. Damrosch, supra note 149, at 217. See id. at 217-18 (observing that while
both resolutions imposed binding economic sanctions rather than military force, the
resolutions provided the foundation for the use of force by the Security Council).
151. Fenwick, supra note 148, at 343; Myers, supra note 55, at 80-81. See Fen-
wick, supra note 148, at 355-56 (quoting Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman,
Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 Am. J.
INT'L L. 15, 18 (1968)) (contending that because the Security Council deemed that the
situation had risen to the level of a threat to international peace, the domestic jurisdic-
tion limitation became irrelevant).
152. Myers, supra note 55, at 80-81.
153. Myers, supra note 55, at 81. Cf. Szasz, supra note 87, at 346 (stating that
apartheid has been found to be not only an egregious violation of human rights stan-
dards but that systematic repression which outrages the world community may trans-
form an essentially domestic issue into a threat to international peace).
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a clear link between inherent human rights in the United Nations
Charter and fundamental levels of international security.154 Even an
essentially domestic conflict, such as civil strife, may threaten the sta-
bility of the international community and constitute a threat to the
peace.'55 Certainly, conflict may be internationalized if the conse-
quences overflow the borders, 156 as in the case of the Kurdish refu-
gees.157 The victims of human rights violations, however, do not need to
cross a geographical boundary in order to be of international concern.
The violation of human rights standards is a matter of international
import even where persons are internally displaced within their own
countries. 58 Because extreme violations of human rights run contrary
to the norms of the Charter, they become internationally significant by
their very nature. 59
Furthermore, despite not finding a threat to international security
which would authorize forceful intervention under Chapter VII, 160 the
Security Council or the General Assembly can sanction military force
to uphold human rights standards.' 6' There is growing recognition that
154. Reisman & McDougal, supra note 17, at 189. See Szasz, supra note 87, at
350 (noting that in the South African case the United Nations held that apartheid is
offensive to the United Nations Charter and is thus by its nature a matter of interna-
tional concern).
155. Szasz, supra note 87, at 346-47. See Myers, supra note 55, at 95-98 (citing
civil war and internal conflicts short of war as threats to the peace, which would permit
United Nations intervention); id. at 97 (listing factors enumerated by the Office of the
United Nations Legal Counsel, which can push an internal conflict into the interna-
tional arena and constitute a threat to the peace, one of which includes severe human
rights violations). But cf. Damrosch, supra note 149, at 219 (finding no authority in the
United Nations Charter for the use of force against transgressions that do not result in
an interstate threat to peace and security).
156. Szasz, supra note 87, at 348.
157. See Resolution Debates, supra note 9, at 58 (observing that the cross-border
impact of the Iraqi repression against its civilians threatens regional stability).
158. See generally Myers, supra note 55, at 77 (reasoning that while the structure
of the United Nations was originally based on the view that threats to international
peace and security would be caused by interstate disputes, the distinction between
wholly internal affairs and those of international concern remains unclear). But cf. Ed-
ward C. Luck & Toby T. Gati, Whose Collective Security, WASH. Q., Spring, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WASHQR File (observing the reluctancy of the
Security Council to characterize massive human rights transgressions within a sover-
eign nation as a threat to the peace authorizing action under Chapter VII, at least over
and above economic or arms sanctions).
159. Szasz, supra note 87, at 350.
160. See Fenwick, supra note 148, at 356 (suggesting that regardless of whether
there is a threat to the peace permitting intervention under Chapter VII, the violation,
if sufficiently severe and persistent, impacts international peace and security, allowing
for intervention).
161. See Reisman & McDougal, supra note 17, at 189 (explaining that if the situ-
ation does not constitute a threat to the peace, the United Nations' prerogative to up-
hold fundamental human rights may induce movement by the Security Council or an-
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the protection of human rights in circumstances of gross and consistent
violations are no longer encompassed within the exclusive domestic ju-
risdiction 1 2 of states.1 3 The recent Security Council debate over Reso-
lution 688 plainly illustrated this point. During the debate, the British
Representative declared that article 2(7) does not apply to matters
which are not fundamentally domestic, such as human rights protec-
tion, and cited South Africa as an illustration.16 4 Thus, severe viola-
tions of human rights, regardless of whether they are deemed a threat
to the peace, are no longer considered to be solely within a state's do-
mestic jurisdiction and are therefore excluded from article 2(7)'s ban
on intervention.1
65
other organ of the United Nations); Damrosch, supra note 149, at 219 (reasoning that
the General Assembly, under articles 10-14 of the United Nations Charter, has the
power to make recommendations to the United Nations or to member states sanction-
ing military force to preserve human rights standards). This force could either be au-
thorized by the United Nations or through the armed forces of national states acting
individually or jointly. Id.
162. The Permanent Court of International Justice established that "the question
whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an
essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of international rela-
tions." Myers, supra note 51, at 74 (quoting Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunisia and
Morocco (Tunis. v. Morocco), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 145 (Feb. 7)). Accord-
ing to Professor Buergenthal, the phrase "the development of international relations"
refers to the legal duties, including international human rights treaties, undertaken by
states. Buergenthal, supra note 67, at 113-14.
163. Felix Ermacora, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction, 124 RECUEIL DES
COURS D'ACADEIlE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 371, 436 (1968-11). See also Myers,
supra note 55, at 85-86 (recognizing that where a consistent pattern of gross violations
of human rights exists, international legal scholars and the United Nations concur that
human rights are no longer a matter subsumed within states' exclusive domestic juris-
diction); Self-Help, supra note 26, at 338 (finding that the interdependence of interna-
tional peace and security and the protection of human rights supports the argument
that human rights no longer fall within exclusive domestic jurisdiction). According to
one representative to the United Nations, the General Assembly has continually re-
garded article 2(7) as permitting United Nations intervention in a state's domestic
matters in situations involving egregious infractions of human rights or of other princi-
ples of the United Nations Charter. Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at
61 n.167.
164. Resolution Debates, supra note 9, at 64-65. In addition, President Bush, refer-
ring to the intervention in northern Iraq, declared that while some may criticize the
action as interference in Iraq's internal affairs, the world community will understand
the compelling need to ensure the administration of humanitarian aid. Winter, supra
note 71, at 7.
165. See Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 62 (asserting that even
in situations not rising to the level of a threat to the peace, article 2(7)'s ban on the use
of force excludes human rights violations); Myers, supra note 55, at 81 (concluding
that regardless of whether the situation is determined to be a threat to international
peace, any nation who is a party to international human rights agreements cannot say
the deprivation of human rights is within their domestic jurisdiction); Tragedies, supra
note 7, at 306 (finding that even where Chapter VII is not utilized, the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention remains viable); Self-Help, supra note 26, at 338 (observing
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In concluding that the Iraqi repression of the civilian population
threatened international peace and security,16 the Security Council ap-
peared to be invoking Chapter VII enforcement action.16 7 Whether or
not this is the case, the excessive human rights violations undertaken by
the Iraqi government transcended the protections implicit in the norms
of sovereignty, 6 8 nonintervention, and exclusive domestic jurisdic-
tion.16 9 Sovereign jurisdiction is conditional upon adherence to minimal
standards of human rights.17 0 The policies of the Iraqi government vio-
that as it becomes more and more clear that international peace and security and the
enforcement of human rights constitute overlapping goals of the United Nations, states
are no longer protected by the domestic jurisdiction clause).
166. See S/RES/688, supra note 8, at pmbl. (stating in paragraph one that the
repression of the Iraqi civilian population threatens international peace and security in
the region, and in the preamble that the refugee flow across international borders as a
result of the subjugation of the Kurdish population threatens international peace and
security).
167. See Int'l Law Perspective, supra note 1, at 74 (maintaining that the interven-
tion in Iraq occurred under Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688 which were ap-
proved under Chapter VII enforcement provisions permitting action once the Security
Council identifies a threat to or breach of international peace); Tragedies, supra note
7, at 306 (stating that the humanitarian intervention in Iraq occurred under Chapter
VII enforcement powers); Schachter, supra note 143, at 468-69 (finding that the legal
justification for the protective measures was based partly upon the Security Council's
determination that Iraq's brutal treatment of the minority Kurds and Shiites created a
threat to international peace and security); Resolution Debates, supra note 9, at 36
(asserting that the Kurdish situation has a bearing on international peace and security,
and thus the Security Council is authorized to exercise its powers to take action to
eradicate the human rights violations); id. at 61 (concluding that while the territorial
integrity and political independence of Iraq must not be undermined, the Security
Council has the duty to take action to cease the barbaric treatment of the civilian
population which is setting the stage for a new international conflict). On the other
hand, others observe that the Resolution was explicitly not adopted under Chapter VII
authorization. See RIGHT V. MIGHT, supra note 3, at 146 (stating that although the
Security Council found a threat to international peace as a result of the refugees cross-
ing international borders, the Resolution was intentionally not adopted under Chapter
VII); No-Fly in Iraq. Why?, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1992, at A24 (stating that Resolu-
tion 688, contrary to the other resolutions passed during the Gulf War, did not invoke
Chapter VII).
168. See Sornarajah, supra note 38, at 76 (noting that the international movement
for the protection of human rights has significantly eroded the concept of state
sovereignty).
169. See generally W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Con-
temporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 869 (1990) (maintaining that no
serious scholar believes in the domestic jurisdiction limitation for internal human
rights); Sornarajah, supra note 38, at 56 (determining that certain humanitarian prin-
ciples surpass the dictates of sovereignty and that when transgressions of human rights
principles occur, the safeguards against intervention upheld by the doctrine of sover-
eignty are inapplicable); Self-Help, supra note 26, at 333 (finding that notwithstanding
the prevailing doctrine of state sovereignty, which protects a nation against intrusion by
other states in the treatment of its own people, consideration for humanitarian princi-
ples allows some restrictions upon this absolutist doctrine).
170. Reisman & McDougal, supra note 17, at 170.
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lated these standards, and, therefore, Iraq may not retreat behind the
principle of state sovereignty.
17 1
Human rights have become increasingly internationalized as states
have undertaken international commitments to human rights, 17 2 either
by treaty or under customary17 3 international law.17 ' Consequently, ar-
ticle 2(7)'s ban on intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of a state
only applies where human rights are not subsumed under international
obligations." 5 For example, as a signatory to the United Nations Char-
ter, Iraq has a duty to support human rights and may not claim that
171. See Resolution Debates, supra note 9, at 53 (concluding that human rights
violations that rise to the level of a crime against humanity become a matter of interna-
tional concern, as demonstrated by the Kurdish situation in Iraq).
172. It is important to note that while the Charter does not explicitly define what
the term "human rights" entails, it is widely accepted that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and other significant human rights documents are subsumed within the
Charter's definition of human rights and basic freedoms. Buergenthal, supra note 67,
at 115. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes the "right to life, liberty
and security of person" (article 3) and freedom from torture or cruel and inhuman
punishment (article 5). G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). See Myers,
supra note 55, at 86-87 & nn. 454-55 (observing that the United Nations has reaf-
firmed the Universal Declaration without opposition innumerable times and therefore
the Declaration has acquired the force of binding customary international law); Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that several scholars have
determined that the Universal Declaration is part of customary international law). But
see Jhabvala, supra note 20, at 220 (claiming that it is debatable whether the Univer-
sal Declaration has been recognized as binding law). For a complete discussion of
human rights instruments, see generally IAN BROWNuE, BASIC DOCUMENrs ON
HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 1981) (including basic tools such as the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). The Genocide Convention
deserves special mention because in the event that enforcement is mandated, article
VIII of the Convention provides that any party may request United Nations action to
prevent and suppress acts of genocide. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951). See generally Reisman & McDou-
gal, supra note 17, at 175 (indicating that the parties are obligated to enforce the
Genocide Convention both separately as well as jointly with the United Nations); Re-
sponse, supra note 22, at 443 (finding that the Genocide Convention covers violations
which under traditional international law would have warranted humanitarian inter-
vention). But see Franck & Rodley, supra note 21, at 300 n.1 10 (contending that the
provisions do not leave room for unilateral self-help).
173. See Myers, supra note 55, at 109 (recognizing that the United Nations Sub-
committee on Human Rights declared that consistent and gross human rights violations
transgress customary international law).
174. Buergenthal, supra note 67, at 113-16.
175. Buergenthal, supra note 67, at 113-16; see also LAUTERPACHT, supra note 27,
at 178 (contending that because human rights are contained in binding international
agreements and are enumerated as one of the basic purposes of the United Nations
Charter, they no longer constitute a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of states).
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the maltreatment of citizens is purely an internal matter.' 6 Conformity
with essential human rights obligations is no longer encompassed
within exclusive domestic jurisdiction but has developed into an issue
justifying concern by the international community. 177 As prominent in-
ternational legal scholar Louis Henkin has aptly observed, "[t]hat
which is governed by international law or agreement is ipso facto and
by definition not a matter of domestic jurisdiction.'
178
Thus, as gross human rights violations by governments against their
own people are no longer encompassed within the internal affairs of
states, the domestic jurisdiction limitation is inapposite in two ways:
first, by the Security Council determination that the deprivation of
rights constitutes a threat to the peace; and second, by virtue of the
state's violations of its international legal obligations.179 In either case,
Iraq's brutal treatment of the Kurdish population could no longer be
considered a purely internal matter insulated within the confines of sov-
ereign inviolability. s8 0 Because such flagrant transgressions are no
longer considered to be within the ambit of the domestic jurisdiction
176. See generally Myers, supra note 55, at 88 (quoting Cyrus Vance before the
University of Georgia Law School, U.S. Dep't. of Public Affairs Office of Media Ser-
vices, Press Release No. 194 (Apr. 30, 1977) at 2 (quoting President Carter's March
1977 speech before the United Nations)) (declaring that because all the parties to the
United Nations Charter have obligated themselves to comply with and uphold elemen-
tary human rights, no member may be permitted to allege that abuse of its people is
solely its own business); Filartiga, supra note 172, at 881 (asserting that according to
the dictates of the Charter, a state's treatment of its own people is a subject of interna-
tional concern).
177. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 740; see Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra
note 19, at 60 (finding the rise in attention to human rights and the whole collection of
declarations and covenants indicative of the dwindling scope of domestic jurisdiction);
Damrosch, supra note 149, at 219 (concluding that the international community has a
legitimate interest in human rights violations regardless of whether they are purely
internal in character, and noting that a state's human rights practice towards its own
nationals is no longer included under claims of domestic jurisdiction beyond the author-
ity of the United Nations).
178. Myers, supra note 55, at 74 (quoting Louis Henkin, Human Rights and 'Do-
mestic Jurisdiction', Paper Presented to the American Society of International Law
Conference on the Helsinki Accord (June 1977) (Strasbourg, Fr.)).
179. Myers, supra note 55, at 79.
180. See generally Sornarajah, supra note 38, at 77 (recommending that states
who continually repress their minorities should not be permitted to hide behind the
impenetrability of the international order of states); Reisman & McDougal, supra note
17, at 169 (asserting that the exclusive jurisdiction of any state is conditional, not abso-
lute); Hurd, supra note 145, at 14 (finding that with regard to Resolution 688, the
United Nations confirmed that there are limits on the level of abuse that governments




limitation, the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs is
inapplicable.181
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. RECOMMENDATIONS
A balance must be struck between the competing norms of noninter-
vention and international human rights standards.182 Sovereignty
should not be viewed as absolute but rather as a flexible concept capa-
ble of restrictions and exceptions. 18 3 Similarly, nonintervention must
function as a relative precept that can be overridden by humanitarian
concerns when atrocities rise to an intolerable level. While articles 2(4)
and 2(7) express strong limitations on state intervention and United
Nations intervention respectively, an increasing number of legal au-
thorities have raised serious challenges to these prohibitions in view of
the alarming rise in repression throughout the world and the ineffec-
tiveness of enforcement mechanisms contemplated by the founders of
the United Nations.184 The United Nations response to the Kurdish sit-
uation suggests that states will no longer tolerate blatant and excessive
human rights violations by a sovereign nation against its own citizens.
Governments that violate fundamental human rights can no longer
withdraw behind the faithful facade of sovereignty and domestic juris-
diction. States should independently, as well as under United Nations
181. Ermacora, supra note 163, at 436. See also Schachter, supra note 143, at 468
(maintaining that Iraq's barbaric suppression of minorities significantly strained the
principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs); Stanley Meislcr and Norman Kemp-
ster, World Leaders Urge U.N. to Safeguard Rights Everywvhere; Summit: Chiefs of
State Declare it is Time to Abandon the Tradition of Non-Interference in Nations'
Affairs. Global Interdependence Cited by Boutros-Ghali, L.A. TiwEs. Feb. 1, 1992, at
Al (stating that the leaders of the Security Council member nations announced that
the international community cannot permit the protection of human rights to stop at
national frontiers and that the United Nations should discard the outdated principle of
nonintervention in states' domestic affairs).
182. See Int'l Law Perspective, supra note 1, at 69 (claiming that the principle of
nonintervention must be balanced against the correspondingly powerful and comple-
mentary imperative of international human rights standards); TtsoN. supra note 20, at
3 (outlining the tension between the protection of human rights and the principle of
state sovereignty).
183. Customary Int'l Law Doctrine, supra note 19, at 44-45; see Myers, supra note
55, at 73 (quoting Friedman, Human Rights Internationalism: A Tentative Critique,
in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY IssuEs 29, 37 (J. Nelson & V.
Green eds. 1980)) (noting that the domestic jurisdiction doctrine has fallen from an
unyielding, absolute norm to a conditional, relative standing); Brownlie, supra note 30,
at 224 (conceding that as compared with the early part of this century, domestic juris-
diction in the context of human rights currently constitutes much less of a shelter
against intervention).
184. Forcible Self-Help, supra note 44, at 199-200.
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auspices, utilize a host of coercive measures to ensure compliance with
human rights law. 8 5 Article 41,186 authorizing measures short of mili-
tary power including economic sanctions and severance of diplomatic
relations, 187 should be employed in all cases of grave human rights
abuse regardless of whether a threat to the peace is established. If
these non-forceful means prove ineffective, the support of the Security
Council should be engaged. Resolution 688 demonstrates the Security
Council's capability to take timely and effective action to remedy se-
vere human rights abuses. However, while the collective security sys-
tem was successfully implemented in Iraq, history dictates that not all
future cases will be comparable.'88 In view of the increasing globaliza-
tion of human rights standards, dwindling notions of state sovereignty,
and a changing world order,1 89 the primary focus should be on reevalu-
185. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 219 (advocating economic sanctions and
other non-military means of enforcing international human rights agreements, regard-
less of whether the violations threaten international security).
186. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
187. Id.
188. See Nafziger, supra note 53, at 27 (suggesting that it is unlikely that the
collective factors that precipitated multilateral action in Iraq will be duplicated).
189. In the past, Cold War tensions impeded the effective implementation of vari-
ous United Nations enforcement provisions, such as the development of United Nations
armed forces. See David J. Scheffer, Prospects for Collective Security in the New
World Order, Remarks at the Beijing Symposium on the Establishment of a New In-
ternational Order 2-3 (Sept. 2, 1991) (transcript on file with The American University
Journal of International Law and Policy) (stating that the Cold War precluded the
United Nations collective security apparatus from developing); id. at 6 (noting that as
provided under article 43, member nations never negotiated special arrangements to
place their troops on-call to the Security Council for enforcement measures against
aggressor states); Kartashkin, supra note 149, at 209 (explaining that the envisioned
United Nations military forces available for enforcement measures were never estab-
lished as a result of the Cold War). Now, however, a multinational military force
should be established, ready for rapid deployment to pressing cases of violence and
human rights abuse throughout the world. See id. (declaring that existing United Na-
tions Charter provisions requiring member states to supply military forces must be revi-
talized); B. De Schutter, Humanitarian Intervention: A United Nations Task, 3 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 21, 35 (1972) (citing several states that have expressed their willingness
and commitment to keep military forces and logistic units available to the United Na-
tions on a continuing basis); A Fresh Start for the U.N., FIN. TI MEs, Mar. 25, 1991, at
20 (suggesting that an international rapid deployment force be formed, which would
take direction from the Security Council); Damrosch, supra note 149, at 216 (speculat-
ing that the diversity reflected among members of the Security Council would limit the
use of a United Nations military force to situations where the global community criti-
cizes the human rights deprivations). In addition, article 45 of the Charter calls for
members to make national air force corps available for collective international enforce-
ment action. U.N. CHARTER art. 45. See also Reply, supra note 22, at 251 n.137
(citing General Gavin's 1971 proposal for a multinational sky cavalry force available to
the United Nations); De Schutter, supra, at 35 (suggesting that national contingents
could be located in their home nations while remaining on stand-by for emergencies).
Alternatively, if the Security Council possesses no forces under its auspices, it could
sanction the use of force by other states. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 216 (ad-
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ating the Security Council in order to consolidate and eventually insti-
tutionalize these actions on behalf of human rights.
The configuration of the Security Council itself presents a formida-
ble obstacle to effective United Nations action in cases that warrant
humanitarian intervention."' 0 As long as the five permanent members
retain veto power, political alliances will clash with humanitarian con-
cerns and quash any attempt at applying the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention broadly to all cases involving severe human rights abuse.
The demise of the Cold War191 and dissolution of the Soviet Union
provide a welcome opportunity to reconfigure the Security Council's
voting requirements and composition in order to reflect modern global
power relations. 192
The justifications for amending the Charter in 1963193 are more
compelling today: to provide for more equitable geographic representa-
tion and to improve the Council's efficacy in undertaking its interna-
tional responsibilities. 19 First, the United Nations should increase the
ding that a regional organization could authorize the intervention irrespective of ap-
proval by the Security Council).
190. See generally Nafziger, supra note 53, at 33 (concluding that the adoption of
Resolution 688 demonstrates the need to reassess the present structure of the Security
Council, noting that the Resolution passed only because China abstained, rather than
vetoing the Resolution); LALL, supra note 113, at 1 (finding that the Security Council
has functioned less effectively than expected and emphasizing the need to evaluate its
configuration and decision-making procedures).
191. See Damrosch, supra note 149, at 217 (observing that during the Cold War
the Security Council rarely used enforcement action notwithstanding numerous cases of
gross human rights deprivations which were closely connected to violations of interna-
tional peace and security).
192. See Nafziger, supra note 53, at 33 (suggesting that enlargement of the per-
manent membership of the Security Council or abolishment of the veto power may be
necessary to consider); Helena Cobban, Let's Rethink the Security Council, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, July 9, 1991, at 18 (stating that the current Security Council configur-
ation was established nearly 50 years ago and due to major world changes since 1945,
modifications in the make-up of the Council should be considered); Amos Perlmutter,
How Should U.N. Reflect Power Shift?, WASH. TimEs, Dec. 29, 1991, at BI (finding
that the Security Council does not reflect the current shift in the global power distribu-
tion and advocating a change in its composition). But cf. Rochelle L. Stanfield,
Worldly Visions, 22 NAT'L J., Oct. 27, 1990, at 2597, 2600 (noting that many experts
believe that proposals to give greater representation to developing nations in an ex-
panded Security Council would prove unwieldy).
193. See BAILEY, supra note 89, at 157 (stating that ever since the number of non-
permanent members was enlarged in the 1960s, various proposals have advocated in-
creasing the number of permanent members).
194. See Leo Gross, In the Post-1965 Amendment Phase and its Impact on Article
25 of the Charter, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 315, 315-16 (1968) (explaining that the purpose
of the 1963 amendment was to allow for better representation of non-permanent mem-
bers and to increase the Security Council's effectiveness under the Charter); Luck &
Gati, supra note 158 (finding that current 'corridor talk' on the topic of Security Coun-
cil membership is more pointed and pressing than before, and that Charter amendment
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number of permanent members to represent the diversity of the world
community."9 5 Germany and Japan, 96 which have resurfaced as global
has occurred in the past in order to increase representation without draconian conse-
quences). On the other hand, Hiscocks has noted that the Soviet Union has opposed
Charter amendment and reassessment of the veto power, adding that a revision confer-
ence would be more harmful than beneficial. HiscoCKS, supra note 94, at 316. But
Hiscocks referred to delaying amendment until the international climate improved, id.
at 316-17, which arguably has occurred with the end of the Cold War and disintegra-
tion of the Soviet Union.
195. See Franck, supra note 129, at 614-15 (calling for systematic reform of the
make-up of the Security Council in order to give other equally significant nations per-
manent membership); BAILEY, supra note 89, at 158-59 (noting the 1971 proposal by
Arthur Lall, former Indian ambassador to the United Nations, who did not believe that
a state's ability to play a role in major international decisions should be determined by
the level of its military or economic power). Lall advocated an increase in the size of
the Council to 19 members, including eight permanent seats and 11 non-permanent
seats, chosen according to ability to maintain peace and security. Id. at 159. In accor-
dance with this plan, the United States, Soviet Union, and China would remain as
permanent members, the British and French seat would merge into one permanent Eu-
ropean Community seat, and permanent membership would be given to Japan, India,
Brazil (or a Latin American rotating seat), and a rotating seat would be given to the
Middle East and Africa. Id. See also LALL, supra note 113, at 35 (suggesting that
under such an arrangement, the permanent members would represent different areas of
the globe, giving all regions a vested interest in international security); HiscocKs,
supra note 94, at 315-17 (observing that the current composition of the Security Coun-
cil is inadequate, where the five permanent members have special voting privileges yet
India, Japan, and Brazil do not). One proposal for modifying the composition of the
Council would be based upon regional representation, with one permanent seat for
Western Europe, along with the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of
American States, and South-East Asia when their organizations become as developed
as the European Community). Id. See also COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION
OF PEACE, STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS 245 (1957) [hereinafter STRENGTH-
ENING THE UN] (contending that the five permanent members do not realistically re-
flect actual power configurations, citing India, Germany and Japan as future contend-
ers for seats, and mentioning a proposal that eliminates the distinction between
permanent and non-permanent members and recommends that all members be elected
by the General Assembly with the assumption that the predominant powers will contin-
ually be selected); COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, THE UNITED
NATIONS: THE NEXT TWENTY-FIvE YEARS 56-57 (1969) [hereinafter NEXT TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS] (discussing a proposal for additional permanent membership that would
focus on factors including population, industrial and commercial significance, and con-
tribution to the United Nations budget, which would allow India, Japan, Germany,
Italy, and Brazil to join the Council). The Commission, however, ultimately decided
against recommending any modifications in the composition of the Security Council at
the time. Id.
196. See 1990 PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INT'L LAW 109-10 [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS] (affirming that
Japan's contributions to the United Nations justify a permanent seat on the Council).
While supporting this idea, the United States had not pursued it because amendment
of the Charter would not have been feasible in the past; new opportunities, however,
may facilitate such developments. Id. See also Marc Fisher, Permanent Security Coun-
cil Seat Appeals to Bonn, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1992, at A25 (quoting Chancellor
Helmut Kohl as stating that international discourse over increasing Security Council
membership is advancing more quickly than most would assume). Japanese and U.S.
officials have been discussing the issue due to Japan's announcement of its desire to
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economic powers, 97 should acquire permanent member status along
with Brazil, Nigeria, India, and Egypt. This restructuring would pro-
vide developing nations with more balanced influence in world af-
fairs. 198 The Italian Foreign Minister recently proposed such an in-
crease in the number of permanent Council members in order to reflect
obtain a permanent seat within three years. Id. See also Miyazawa Calls for Revising
U.N. Security Council, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, AFP File (noting that Japan will replace the Soviet Union next year as
the second largest contributor to the United Nations, after the United States).
197. See Stanfield, supra note 192, at 2600 (stating that a Security Council with-
out Germany and Japan represents the post-World War II world order, not the post-
Cold War world order); Candidate Urges Permanent UINSC Seats for Japan, Ger-
many, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, Dec. 13, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, JEN File (citing then Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton as calling
for United States leadership in increasing Security Council membership and adding
Japan and Germany as permanent members with the veto power); PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 196, at 112 (declaring that the United Nations Charter, particularly article 107
references to Japan and Germany as enemy states, should be amended to accord proper
respect to Japan and Germany and to ensure the viability of the United Nations).
Article 107 states that "[niothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude
action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy
of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by
the Governments having responsibility for such action." U.N. CHARTER art. 107.
198. See Weston, supra note 104, at 527 (noting that the current composition of
the Security Council does not fairly represent the Third World, and raising the issue of
permanent representation for Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, or Nigeria, and Germany
and Japan in order to ensure effective peace and security operations); Franck, supra
note 125, at 615 (stating that one reform currently under consideration would offer
permanent membership with no veto power to Japan, Germany, India, Egypt, Nigeria,
Mexico, and Brazil); LALL, supra note 113, at 30-32 (advocating establishment of a
broader base of decision-makers in the Security Council by offering permanent mem-
bership to representatives of all the significant areas of the globe); Douglas Roche, A
U.N. Agenda for Barbara McDougall, TOROTO STAR, Sept. 9, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, TSTAR File (urging the Canadian Secretary of State for Ex-
ternal Affairs to support Japan, India, Brazil, and Nigeria in their bids for permanent
seats on the Security Council in order to ensure more diverse representation); Luck &
Gati, supra note 158 (recommending that Germany and Japan become permanent
members without the veto power and that rotating seats without the veto be given to
Africa, Asia, and Latin America); Stanley Meisler, The Security Council: Is Bigger
Better?; There is a Move to Add Japan and Germany to the U.N.'s Top Body. But Old
Realities May Deny the Two Economic Giants a Larger Role in the World Organiza-
tion, L.A. TiMEs, May 14, 1991, at H2 (citing several proposals for change in the
number of permanent members of the Security Council). The first would add Japan
and Germany to the five current permanent members, with all seven exercising veto
power; the second would include the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the Euro-
pean Community, and Japan as permanent members with veto power: the third would
incorporate the five current permanent members with Japan, Germany, Brazil, and
Nigeria, all with veto power; and the fourth would encompass the current five perma-
nent members with veto power and Japan, Germany, Brazil, India, and Nigeria as
permanent members without veto power. Id. But cf. id. (noting that the addition of
more permanent members with veto power may impair the Security Council's ability to
work effectively).
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recent changes in the world balance19 of power.200 Such changes would
not be easily accomplished 20' and are not likely to occur in the near
future, 2  given the likelihood that the five permanent members would
veto an amendment 203 to reorganize the Security Council.20 4 Neverthe-
less, the United Nations must contemplate change sooner or later in
order to more adequately represent the changing distribution of world
power and to ensure effective and consistent Security Council enforce-
ment action.20 5
199. See Brian Urquhart, Coming in from the Cold: The UN's Role in the Emerg-
ing Era, HARV. INT'L R., Summer 1991, at 21, 24 (concluding that the current compo-
sition of the Security Council is anachronistic and does not accurately reflect the bal-
ance of global power). Due to the tremendous shift in economic, political, and military
power since 1945, it is impossible to include Britain as a world power, while excluding
Japan, Germany, Brazil, India, or Nigeria. Id.
200. See Gerry Gray, Italy Urges Sweeping Structural Changes at U.N., N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991, at 3 (quoting the Foreign Minister, Gianni de Michelis, as stat-
ing that the criteria for additional permanent membership should include wealth, popu-
lation, and influence in global matters). See id. (noting that membership in the United
Nations has increased by 50 percent since the current number of Security Council seats
was established in 1963 and that many nations, primarily developing countries, have
advocated a restructuring of the Security Council). See also Fisher, supra note 196
(stating that United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali supports permanent
membership for Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, and Nigeria); Hamilton, supra note 70
(advocating an expansion of Security Council seats, which would broaden the legiti-
macy of Council decisions on intervention, and suggesting discussion of one proposal
which would add permanent membership for Japan, Germany, and the European Com-
munity, and expand Third World representation).
201. See COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, MODERNIZING
THE SECURITY COUNCIL 12 (1974) (contending that efforts to reconsider the status quo
could result in greater international strain). None of the big-five have displayed any
willingness to relinquish their privileged status and a veto from any of them would
negate any opportunity for change. Id.
202. See Gray, supra note 200 (quoting the Italian Foreign Minister as supporting
implementation of the proposal over the span of several years); Meisler, supra note 198
(quoting former Undersecretary-General of the United Nations, Ronald Spiers, as stat-
ing that changes may be inevitable within five to ten years).
203. See WILCOX & MARCY, supra note 115, at 305-06 & n.16 (noting that one
proposal to amend the United Nations Charter would allow a reevaluation of the num-
ber of permanent members each decade, allowing the composition of the Council to be
altered without necessitating repeated amendment of the Charter).
204. See Gray, supra note 200, at 3 (noting that the permanent members have not
supported any amendments to the Charter which might impact upon their own power
and status); Fisher, supra note 196 (stating that Security Council reform is a long-
shot); Paul Lewis, End of the Soviet Union; 3 Western Powers Favor Russian Take-
over of Soviet U.N. Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1991, at A8 (observing that while
several nations want to amend the Charter to redistribute the permanent members'
power, the United States, Britain and France are determined to avoid any reform that
would affect Security Council membership and veto power).
205. See WILCOX & MARCY, supra note 115, at 299 (maintaining that the recur-
rent Soviet veto and inadequate representation of member nations has continually ham-
pered the Security Council's ability to carry out its intended functions); BAILEY, supra
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Second, in addition to altering the size and composition of the Secur-
ity Council, proposals for limiting the veto power should be evaluated,
particularly in view of the overwhelming dominance of politics206 in the
Council.20 7 It is unlikely that the permanent members of the Security
Council would be granted the veto power if the Charter were drafted
anew.208 The veto privilege constitutes a fundamental cause of the
note 89, at 158-59 (noting Lall's view that the narrow interests of the permanent mem-
bers preclude the Security Council from undertaking its functions).
206. See Myers, supra note 55, at 114 (characterizing Security Council determina-
tions as primarily political decisions affected by different alliances); Reply, supra note
22, at 239 (quoting W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION 850 (1971)) (as-
serting that in most cases clashing interests of divergent political systems will preclude
action). A case in point is the deplorable situation in Bosnia-Hercegovinia and the for-
mer Yugoslavia. Cf. Hamilton, supra note 70 (finding that the state of affairs threatens
international peace and security). Serbian forces are using brutal force against Bosnia
which may extend throughout the former Yugoslavia and beyond, millions of citizens
have been displaced, and human rights violations are rampant. Id. Yet, for political
reasons, the Bush Administration and the European nations have been slow to respond.
Id.
207. See BAILEY, supra note 89, at 159-60 (contending that proposals which rec-
ommend an increase in the permanent membership but do not address the veto power
would be unlikely to improve the effectiveness of the Security Council); Marco A.
Sibaja, United Nations: Members Insist on Changes in Security Council, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Oct. 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES File (quoting
Venezuelan President Perez as stating that the only way the United Nations will be-
come stronger is by abolishing the veto power); STANLEY FOUNDATION, DECISION-
MAKING PROCESSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS: NINTH CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED
NATIONS OF THE NEXT DECADE 17 (1974) (explaining that numerous representatives
at the conference suggested that the veto be gradually limited until it eventually be-
comes obsolete); WILCOX & MARCY, supra note 115, at 309 (observing that numerous
Americans have pressured the United States government to modify the veto power,
abolish it, or restrain its use); Margaret Weiers, Time for U.N. to Revamp Security
Council, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 17, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TSTAR
File (asserting that the end of the Cold War presents the United Nations with an
opportunity to acknowledge the advent of the new world order by amending the Char-
ter to abandon permanent membership and the veto power, thus forcing the Security
Council to function more democratically); STRENGTHENING THE UN, supra note 195,
at 248 (suggesting that the veto be retained for mandatory enforcement action but not
for recommendations that authorize enforcement action); NEXT TWENTY-FiVE YEARS,
supra note 195, at 60-61 (recommending abolition of the veto power in enforcement
decisions under Chapter VII that do not authorize United Nations military force, and
advocating new voting rules in Chapter VI and eventually Chapter VII that would
permit decisions by a concurrence of a majority of permanent members and a majority
of non-permanent members as long as no member state is compelled to use military
force against its wishes). But cf. VOTING, supra note 114, at 101-02 (recognizing the
absurdity in believing that the veto power could be defeated merely by an amendment
to the Charter, because the veto power was and is a precondition to the participation of
the permanent members in the United Nations); LALL, supra note 113, at 29 (noting
that given the composition of the Council at that time, explicit limitations on the veto
power would not have been feasible); id. at 36 (asserting that the primary obstacle to
effective Council action comes from the Security Council's reluctance to initiate meet-
ings when threats to international peace and security arise, not from the veto power).
208. BAILEY, supra note 89, at 109.
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United Nations' inability to consistently enforce international law and
human rights standards. 0 For example, it would not be surprising if
China vetoed a resolution similar to Resolution 688 that sanctioned in-
tervention to contain human rights violations in Tibet.2 10 Now, how-
ever, the demise of the Cold War and corresponding disintegration of
the bipolar world provide an unparalleled opportunity to reconsider the
veto privilege. Challenges and obstacles to this fundamental reassess-
ment should not detract from the crucial need to place the issue on the
agenda for international discussion and commentary.
Regardless of whether the Security Council is augmented to include
additional permanent members or whether the veto power is reap-
praised, the definition of the level of human rights deprivations which
constitute a threat to the peace must be expanded 211 to ensure compe-
tent and consistent Security Council response. As previously discussed,
Security Council jurisdiction should be extended to include situations
of gross violations of human rights that may not precipitate interstate
consequences and would not ordinarily be deemed a threat to the
peace. 2
209. Reply, supra note 22, at 245 (quoting Wolfgang Friedmann, General Course
in Public International Law, 127 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL 39, 68-69 (1969-11)). See also BAILEY, supra note 89, at 213 (pointing out
the difficulty in determining the number of proposals that were never introduced be-
cause of the expectation of a veto); Tickell, supra note 118, at 311-12 (conceding that
the veto power removed disputes, particularly during the Cold War, from the United
Nations system); WILCOX & MARCY, supra note 115, at 140-41 (claiming that while
enforcement action is contingent upon the unanimity of the permanent members, this
requisite unanimity has not occurred since the establishment of the United Nations,
and noting that many proposals to eliminate the veto power in enforcement action have
been put forth); STRENGTHENING THE UN, supra note 195, at 33 (recommending
gradual restriction of the veto power because of its impact on the Security Council's
ability to carry out its functions). The 1948 Vanderberg Resolution advocated eliminat-
ing the veto power for admission of new members and peaceful settlements of disputes
under Chapter VI, and extending the restrictions on the veto into Chapter VII. Id,
These changes would allow the Security Council to make recommendations regarding
the presence of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, and to
authorize sanctions if the provisional actions were not followed. Id.
210. Cf. Bruce Fein, Kurdish Enclaves More Curio Than Paradigm, N.J.L.J.,
May 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NJLAWJ File (concluding that
either the Soviet Union or China could have vetoed Resolution 688 given that both
have experienced internal upheavals similar to those in Iraq, and noting that neither
exercised the veto power in this particular instance because of self-interest in United
States monetary and trade benefits).
211. See Paul Lewis, The Right to Intervene for a Humanitarian Cause, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 1992, at 22 (noting that the Security Council at its January summit
confirmed its right to intervene by recognizing non-military threats to the peace, in-
cluding the area of human rights).
212. See supra notes 147-65 and accompanying text (discussing expanding notions
of what constitutes a threat to the peace). Furthermore, in order to avoid political




Regardless of whether humanitarian intervention becomes the rule or
the exception, Resolution 688 suggests that states can no longer retreat
behind claims of sovereignty in order to defeat humanitarian assis-
tance.2 13 The Resolution evinces a dramatic departure from the view
that severe human rights violations are matters of internal concern,
shielded from Security Council jurisdiction.214 The recent election of
United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali bolsters hope that
these issues will rise to the forefront of international dialogue. 21" Fur-
thermore, the collapse of the Cold War provides a unique opportunity
to institute lasting and significant changes to the international legal
system. The current configuration of the Security Council must be re-
assessed in light of changing political realities to better secure a collec-
tivized effort in protecting international human rights throughout the
curity Council review of such situations. See A Strengthened Humanitarian Regime
for the Post-Cold War Era: Hearing Before the House Select Committee on Hunger,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 168-69 (1991) (testimony of Larry Minear, entitled A Strength-
ened Humanitarian Regime for the Post-Cold War Era) [hereinafter Mineari (includ-
ing the number of people affected and the severity of the human rights deprivations as
some of the indicators that would automatically trigger Security Council consideration
and noting that once the situation is reviewed, media attention and non-governmental
organizational pressure would make it more difficult for the Security Council to remain
inactive). See also Luck & Gati, supra note 158 (advocating the development of a
system for intervention that would push the Security Council into action, for example,
situations of genocide, massive refugee flows into adjacent nations, and egregious viola-
tions of human rights).
213. See Minear, supra note 212, at 5 (noting that international responsibility for
human life is seen as increasingly superior to state sovereignty); Ved P. Nanda, The
Plight of the Kurds Prompts Re-examination of International Law, DEcv. POST, May
5, 1991 at 4H (concluding that one positive aspect of the Kurdish catastrophe is that it
established a precedent that will hopefully help avoid another similar tragedy): Roberta
Cohen, Refugee Policy Group, Human Rights Protection for Internally Displaced Per-
sons 27 (June 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The American University
Journal of International Law and Policy) (asserting that Resolution 688 created a
strong precedent for United Nations involvement in protecting the rights of internally
displaced peoples). Some interpret the Resolution as authorizing United Nations mili-
tary protection for victims like the Kurds, while others do not stretch the interpretation
so far; United Nations guards only had authorization to defend the relief operation
itself, not the Kurdish victims. Id. In either case, Resolution 688 stands for the princi-
ple that the world community must act swiftly to curb situations of grave human rights
deprivations. Id.
214. See generally Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Human Rights. 'Territorial Integrity',
WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1991, at A9 (observing that prior to Resolution 688 brutality by
a government against its own citizens was deemed an internal matter outside of Secur-
ity Council jurisdiction).
215. See 10-member Security Council Sought. Report Says, OTTAWA CrzEN,
Feb. 9, 1992, at B8 (stating that United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali ad-
vocates increasing the number of permanent members to ten, adding India, Brazil, Ja-
pan, Germany, and Nigeria).
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world. Only then can the international community ensure that traves-
ties, such as occurred in Iraq, are avoided in the future.
